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The Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 in Context-
Reflections on International Legal and Institutional
Failings, "Fixes," and Fundamentals
John W. Head*
SYNOPSIS
In this contribution to the symposium on the world financial crisis,
Professor Head offers his observations on several aspects of the recent
financial chaos that has gripped-and partially paralyzed-the world.
First, he traces how the crisis unfolded and what institutional responses
it elicited, especially at the international level. In this respect he places
special emphasis on the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") and its
performance and future prospects. He then proceeds to explain the
broader picture of financial crises into which this one fits, by briefly
surveying several twentieth-century episodes offinancial chaos. On this
basis he identifies several specific legal and institutional failings that the
current crisis has revealed at the international level. He also discusses
several "fixes" that are underway, or that might be tried, to address
these failings. He closes by exploring a few "findamentals", particularly
(i) certain fundamental changes that might (in principle) be undertaken
to prevent a repeat of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and (ii) some
fundamental ideological values and human realities that will likely stand
in the way of any significant reform.
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I. INTRODUCTION: WHICH "CRISIS," AND WHY SHOULD WE STUDY IT?
In this article I offer my views on the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and
2009, as my contribution to the October 2009 Symposium sponsored by the
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law on the subject "Local to
Global: Rethinking Spheres of Authority After a World Financial Crisis." I am
quite pleased to have been invited to participate in the symposium and to have
my views published in the symposium issue of the PACIFIC McGEORGE GLOBAL
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BUSINESS & DEVELOPMENT LAW JOURNAL. In keeping with common practice
for such "symposium issues" of law journals, I have, with the kind permission of
the Journal's editorial staff, structured this article more in the form of an essay,
with somewhat less comprehensive citations to authority than might otherwise be
provided.'
In the remainder of this section, I wish to address three introductory
questions: (a) what specifically am I referring to in speaking of the "Global
Financial Crisis of 2008-2009" (which I shall usually refer to below as the "GFC
08/09"), as there might well be differing definitions of it; (b) what is to be gained
by reviewing this crisis, now that it seems to be settling into some form of
resolution; and (c) in particular, why might it be fruitful to take a legal and
institutional perspective in reviewing the crisis?
In Section II, I offer a review of how a range of experts understands the GFC
08/09 to have emerged out of developments (some would say defects) of the past
decade or so and exploded into public consciousness in 2008.
In Section III, I turn my attention to the international responses to the crisis,
and particularly the legal and institutional response at the international level,
including especially the Group of Twenty and the International Monetary Fund
("IMF").
In Section IV, I widen the field of view by placing the GFC 08/09 in a larger
historical context to help us consider certain aspects of the GFC 08/09 (and the
international community's response to it) in a more objective and comparative
light. With that as background, I offer in Section V a series of observations about
the GFC 08/09 from a "longer view." Some of these observations take the form
of questions that I believe cannot be definitively answered right now but that are
central to this key issue: What steps (if any) of a legal and institutional nature can
we take to prevent an even worse global financial meltdown from occurring in
the future?
A. Defining the GFC 08/09
Although other definitions might well be valid for other purposes, the
"Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009" that I wish to explore here revolves
1. In particular, I have assumed that other symposium participants, and most readers, will already be
generally familiar with the history, organization, and operations of the International Monetary Fund; hence I
have provided relatively few explanatory or research-oriented citations regarding that institution - relying
instead on some general citations to works that I and others have written on it. In this and several other respects
I have tried to keep a relatively clean "story line" without the distraction of extensive background explanations
or citations. I greatly appreciate the cooperation and flexibility of the editorial staff at the Journal in this respect
and for the assistance and patience they have shown in the preparation and publishing process. I also wish to
thank Ms. Heba Hazzaa (research associate at the Cairo University School of Law), Ms. Maria Neal, and Ms.
Dana Watts-all of whom contributed importantly to my work in compiling this article-and to express my
appreciation also to Lawrence Indyk, Lucia Orth, and my colleagues and fellow participants in the symposium
for offering helpful comments and suggestions. As usual, research assistance from the University of Kansas
General Research Fund is also gratefully acknowledged.
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around private-sector financial institutions and public-sector regulators. This
crisis featured the development of imaginative and complex new financial
products, the collapse of major U.S. investment banks when those new financial
products suddenly lost value, the spread of financial panic from the United States
to other countries, the freezing-up of credit, the frantic efforts of national
regulatory authorities around the world to stop the panic by thawing credit and
saving certain large financial institutions, and the desperate collective actions
taken by international authorities to prevent the crisis from leading to another
Great Depression.
What this definition does not include is the whole range of other economic
problems and traumas that resulted from these financial-sector developments. For
example, although the collapse around the world in values of equities-shown
most dramatically in the precipitous fall of the Dow Jones Industrial Average-is
obviously of tremendous importance, I shall not attempt to give any attention to
that development. Nor shall I focus on other sectors of the U.S. economy-the
housing sector, for example--except to note in Section II the role that such
sectors seem to have played in triggering the onset of the financial crisis.
Indeed, to the extent possible I shall avoid any U.S.-specific perspective.
There is little question that the GFC 08/09 has most of its origins in the United
States, and for that reason my attention will naturally be drawn to some
developments in that country. However, as explained more fully below, my
principal interest is in exploring the lessons we might gain for action and reform
at the international level. Therefore, the details of U.S.-specific financial
regulation-past or future-are of little direct interest to me here other than for
illustrative purposes.
I should address another point about the definitions I use here: Is it a sign of
confidence on my part that I call it "the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009"?
That is, does this suggest that I am sure it is over? Not exactly. At least by my
definition, a "crisis" cannot last more than a year or so; at some point it becomes
either a recovery or a meltdown. At this point (October 2009) it seems as if a
recovery has started. Events in coming months, of course, might prove this to be
a false start; and even if we are in fact moving into a recovery, the distress
unleashed in these two most traumatic years of 2008 and 2009 will last far into
the future for many individuals and many nations.2
2. A recent IMF report is said to conclude that "on average, seven years after a bust an economy's level
of output was almost 10% below where it would have been without the crisis." Simon Cox, The Long Climb,
ECONOMIsT, Oct. 3, 2009, at 3. This reduction in productivity will come on top of enormous losses in national
wealth already caused by the crisis. "From the start of 2008 to the spring of [2009] the crisis knocked ... $11
trillion off the value of homes." Id.
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B. Why Does It Matter?
Given the unpleasantness of the crisis and its repercussions, we might prefer
to avoid re-hashing it. Indeed, if we consider the fact that the GFC 08/09 is
merely the latest in a string of global financial crises (a fact I will explore in
Section IV of this article) we might well be tempted to throw up our hands in
despair and jettison any hope to understand it or avoid its repetition. As I shall
explain below in Section V, that conclusion strikes me as one of several
reasonable conclusions. However, it is not a conclusion we can legitimately draw
before at least giving serious thought to whether there is hope for preventing, or
at least mitigating, another big global financial crisis that might be lurking on the
horizon. Indeed, I understand the reason for this symposium in Sacramento to be
precisely that-to give serious thought to the possibility of preventing future
cnses.
I would also offer another reason for subjecting the GFC 08/09 to our careful
collective scrutiny: there should be some accounting as to where responsibility
lies for a crisis that has brought such deep distress to so many people. In a
companion article to this one,' I offer some views about the causes of and
responsibility for the Asian financial crisis that erupted in 1997. I would like to
think that an examination of these two crises, only about a dozen years apart, can
yield some useful lessons and place responsibility on some types of bad actors
whose mischief can be stopped.
C. Why Take a Legal and Institutional Point of View?
Before concluding these introductory remarks, I should explain why I believe
we should give special emphasis to legal and institutional matters in our
assessment of the GFC 08/09. The explanation centers around the notion of
financial regulation, and around how such regulation operates on two distinct
levels.
I assume most people would agree that much of the responsibility for
avoiding (or at least mitigating) financial crises of the sort we have just
experienced (or that erupted in Asia in the late 1990s) lies with regulatory
agencies, acting under national laws and procedures. In many countries, this sort
of regulation lies within the authority of central banks or Ministries of Finance or
other similar government authorities. The outbreak of a major crisis suggests that
the regulatory action taken by such authorities has been inadequate, and therefore
that the national laws under which those authorities operate are likewise
inadequate. The examination of such inadequacies at the national level, and the
measures taken to overcome those inadequacies, are therefore worthy of
attention.
3. See John W. Head, The Asian Financial Crisis in Retrospect-Observations on Legal and
Institutional Lessons Learned after a Dozen Years,_ E.ASIA L. REv. (2010) [hereinafter Head-2010].
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What I am more interested in examining, however, is the "regulation of the
regulators"-those actions taken not at the level of the national regulators but
instead at the international level. After all, it is at the international level where we
should expect to see some effective efforts to ensure that national laws and
regulations-created and implemented by national governments-are adequate to
prevent financial chaos from erupting and causing harm not only to the people to
whom those governments are directly accountable, but also to other countries and
the global financial system as a whole.
Much of the institutional responsibility for such "regulation of the
regulators" in the sphere of financial stability rests officially with the
International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), which exerts influence in a variety of
ways over national economic and financial policies. In addition, since the time of
the 1982 debt crisis, the IMF has generally been expected to play a key role in
responding to financial crises when they do break out. The same thing occurred
as the GFC 08/09 unfolded: in ways I shall explain below in subsection III(A),
the Group of Twenty ("G-20") has repeatedly referred to the important role that
the IMF should play in handling the crisis. Accordingly, I shall give special
attention in this article to the IMF's response-both in terms of its operations and
in terms of its structure and governance-to the GFC 08/09.
II. THE UNFOLDING OF THE CRISIS
A. A Timeline of Turbulence
In this section, I intend to offer a review of how informed observers
understand the GFC 08/09 to have emerged out of developments (some would
say defects) of the past decade or so and exploded into public consciousness in
2008. To this end, let us start with a timeline setting forth some factual
highlights-dates and developments-that will serve as a background for the
discussions that follow, briefly identifying underlying causes of the crisis,
specific triggers of the crisis, and government responses (both in the U.S. and
abroad) to the crisis.
A chronology of key events in the unfolding of the GFC 08/09 would surely
include these features, most of which occurred in the United States:
* February 27, 2007: The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(Freddie Mac) announces that it will no longer buy the most risky
subprime mortgages and mortgage-related securities.
4. This timeline draws heavily on (and in many cases uses terminology and entries from) THE FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: A TIMELINE OF EVENTS AND POLICY ACIONS, 1-28,
http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/pdf/CrisisTimeline.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2010) [hereinafter CRISIS TIMELINE].
Although the timeline published by the Federal Reserve Bank extends up to February 2010, the excerpts I have
provided here extend only up to June 2009.
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* April 2, 2007: New Century Financial Corporation, a leading
subprime mortgage lender, files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection....
* July 31, 2007: Bear Steams liquidates two hedge funds that invested
in various types of mortgage-backed securities.
* August 6, 2007: American Home Mortgage Investment Corporation
files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection....
* August 9, 2007: BNP Paribas, France's largest bank, halts
redemptions on three investment funds....
* September 14, 2007: The Chancellor of the Exchequer authorizes the
Bank of England to provide liquidity support for Northern Rock, the
United Kingdom's fifth-largest mortgage lender....
* February 13, 2008: [U.S.] President [George W.] Bush signs the
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-185) into law.
* February 17, 2008: Northern Rock is taken into state ownership by
the Treasury of the United Kingdom.
* July 13, 2008: The Federal Reserve Board authorizes the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York to lend to the Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae) and ... Freddie Mac, should such lending
prove necessary. ...
* July 30, 2008: President Bush signs into law the Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-289), which
among other provisions, authorizes the Treasury to purchase
[Government Sponsored Enterprise] (GSE) obligations and reforms
the regulatory supervision of the GSEs under a new Federal Housing
Finance Agency. ...
* September 7, 2008: The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)
places Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in government
conservatorship....
* September 15, 2008: Lehman Brothers Holdings Incorporated files
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.
* September 16, 2008: The Federal Reserve Board authorizes the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York to lend up to [US]$85 billion to
the American International Group (AIG) under Section 13(3) of the
Federal Reserve Act....
* September 17, 2008: The [Securities and Exchange Commission]
(SEC) announces a temporary emergency ban on short selling in the
stocks of all companies in the financial sector.
* September 18, 2008: The [Federal Open Market Committee of the
Federal Reserve Board] (FOMC) expands existing swap lines by
49
2010 / The Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009
[US]$180 billion and authorizes new swap lines with the Bank of
Japan, Bank of England, and Bank of Canada....
* September 24, 2008: The FOMC establishes new swap lines with the
Reserve Bank of Australia and the Sveriges Riksbank for up to
[US]$10 billion each and with the Danmarks Nationalbank and the
Norges Bank for up to [US]$5 billion each....
* October 3, 2008: [U.S.] Congress passes and President Bush signs
into law the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (Public
Law 110-343), which establishes the [US]$700 billion Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP). . . .
* October 29, 2008: The [IMF] announces the creation of a short-term
6liquidity facility for market-access countries....
* November 18, 2008: Executives of Ford, General Motors, and
Chrysler testify before Congress, requesting access to the TARP
[funding]....
* December 12, 2008: The U.S. Treasury Department purchases a total
of [US]$6.25 billion in preferred stock in 28 U.S. banks under the
Capital Purchase Program.. .. [This is the first of several such
purchases.]
* December 19, 2008: The U.S. Treasury Department authorizes loans
of up to [US]$13.4 billion for General Motors and [US]$4.0 billion
for Chrysler from the TARP....
* February 6, 2009: The Federal Reserve Board releases additional
terms and conditions of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan
Facility (TALF). Under the TALF, the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York will lend up to [US]$200 billion to eligible owners of certain
AAA-rated asset-backed securities backed by newly and recently
originated auto loans, credit card loans, student loans and [Small
Business Administration]-guaranteed small business loans....
* February 17, 2009: President [Barack] Obama signs into law the
"American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009", which
includes a variety of spending measures and tax cuts intended to
promote economic recovery....
* February 18, 2009: President Obama announces The Homeowner
Affordability and Stability Plan. The plan includes a program to
5. Id.
6. Id.; See also Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], IMF Survey Magazine: Policy, IMF to Launch New Facility
for Emerging Markets Hit by Crisis, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/ so/2008/POL102908A.htm
(Oct. 29, 2008). This Short Term Liquidity Facility was discontinued about half a year later when the IMF
created the Flexible Credit Line. See Press Release, IMF, IMF Overhauls Lending Framework, No. 09/85 (Mar.
24, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/pr/2009/pr0985.htm [hereinafter IMF Overhaul].
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permit the refinancing of [certain] conforming home mortgages
owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac .... In
addition, the U.S. Treasury Department will increase its preferred
stock purchase agreements with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to
[US]$200 billion, and increase the limits on the size of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac's portfolios to [US]$900 billion....
* February 25, 2009: The Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
and Office of Thrift Supervision announce that they will conduct
forward-looking economic assessments or "stress tests" of eligible
U.S. bank holding companies with assets exceeding [US]$100 billion
[to determine their ability to absorb likely] losses over a two-year
period....
* March 19, 2009: The U.S. Department of the Treasury announces an
Auto Supplier Support Program that will provide up to [US]$5
7billion in financing to the automotive industry....
* March 24, 2009: The IMF announces an overhaul of its lending
framework, including these key components':
o Modernizing IMF conditionality;
o Introducing a flexible credit line;
o Enhancing the flexibility of the regular stand-by lending
arrangement;
o Doubling access limits for member countries' use of IMF funds;
o Adapting and structures of cost and maturity for its lending; and
o Eliminating certain lending programs that were seldom used.
* March 31, 2009: The U.S. Treasury Department announces an
extension of its temporary Money Market Funds Guarantee Program
through September 18, 2009 ... [to] continue to provide coverage to
shareholders up to the amount held in participating money market
funds as of the close of business on September 19, 2008....
* April 24, 2009: The Federal Reserve Board publishes a white paper
describing the process and methodologies employed by federal
banking supervisory authorities in their . . . "stress test" of large U.S.
bank holding companies....
* May 20, 2009: President Obama signs the Helping Families Save
Their Homes Act of 2009, which temporarily raises [coverage under
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation] from [US]$100,000 per
depositor to [US]$250,000 per depositor....
7. CRISiS TIMELINE, supra note 4.
8. IMF Overhaul, supra note 6.
51
2010 / The Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009
* May 21, 2009: Standard and Poor's Ratings Services [(S&P)] lowers
its outlook on the United Kingdom government debt from stable to
negative because of the estimated fiscal cost of supporting the
nation's banking system. S&P estimates that this cost could double
the government's debt burden to about 100 percent of [Gross
Domestic Product] by 2013....
* June 1, 2009: As part of a new restructuring agreement with the U.S.
Treasury and the governments of Canada and Ontario, General
Motors Corporation and three domestic subsidiaries announce that
they have filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code.9
B. Underlying Causes and Specific Triggers
Having provided the timeline above-enumerating some specific dates and
developments as the GFC 08/09 unfolded-I turn now from bare facts to a
summary analysis of three points. First, in this subsection, I report on what are
commonly identified as the underlying causes and the specific triggers of the
crisis. Then, in subsection C, I draw attention to some highlights of the U.S.
government's response to the crisis. Lastly, in subsection D, I offer illustrations
of how the crisis spread to other countries, and the efforts of governments in
those other countries to handle the chaos it brought.
The underlying causes of the GFC 08/09, according to a variety of experts,
center around such matters as the U.S. housing bubble, inappropriate U.S.
monetary policy, under-regulation of U.S. and international financial markets,
and over-sophistication of relatively new types of financial instruments. The
claim that a U.S. housing bubble is to blame relies on the following logic.'o To
begin with, too many new homes were built, creating an oversupply of housing.
To sell these houses, banks and other lenders were willing to do "subprime"
lending-that is, to lend money to persons who did not qualify for Fannie Mae or
Freddie Mac programs. These highly leveraged borrowers defaulted when their
circumstances changed. Banks "attempted to resell the houses, exacerbating the
oversupply of housing."" Home values, which had long been thought to move in
only one direction-up--began to come down. By October 2008, the average
home price had fallen twenty percent from its 2006 peak.12
9. CRISIS TIMELINE, supra note 4.
10. Except as otherwise noted, the details set forth in this paragraph and the following paragraph are
drawn largely from DAVID A. WESTBROOK, OUT OF CRISIS: RETHINKING OUR FINANCIAL MARKETS 19, 24
(2010).
11. Id.
12. See A Helping Hand to Homeowners, ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 2008, fig. Falling off the property
ladder.
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One of the reasons U.S. home prices tended to increase in earlier years can
be found in the process of securitization. In this process, banks and other
mortgage lenders bundled their home loans and sold them to special purpose
entities, which transformed them into securities that were then sold to investors
both in the United States and abroad. This process allowed banks to recoup their
investments much more quickly than waiting to be paid back by the borrowers
over 30 years; therefore, it gave the banks more capital to make loans, which in
turn made it easier for consumers to get loans. Moreover, because the lenders
intended to sell the loans soon after they made them, they cared less and less
about their borrowers' financial solidity and prospects.
A second alleged cause cited for the outbreak of the crisis is poor monetary
policy. Critics point to the fact that the U.S. Federal Reserve Board repeatedly
lowered interest rates. For example, between June 28, 2007, and October 29,
2008, the so-called "federal funds" rate dropped from 5.25% to 1.00%." The easy
financing led to higher amounts of consumer debt.14 In the United States,
household debt rose to 127% of annual disposable personal income in 2008
versus just 77% in 1990." Another alleged monetary-policy fault was the Federal
Reserve Board's policy of believing its prime task was to keep inflation low and
stable, instead of attending to systemic risk. 6
A third suspected cause of the financial crisis was overly lax regulation of the
financial markets, particularly in the United States. "In this view, . . . [t]he
oversight of the SEC, as exemplified by its failure to [discover and shut down]
Bernard Madoff's Ponzi scheme was simply inadequate for the task of regulating
the largest financial markets in the world." 7 Two of the reasons for the lack of
sufficient supervision were "fragmented regulatory structures and legal
constraints on information sharing."'" Problems such as this became apparent
both within borders and internationally.' 9 Furthermore, regulation did not keep
pace with the growing importance of the shadow banking system (which includes
investment banks and hedge funds), the markets in derivatives, and off-balance-
sheet financing. As a result of this laxity or absence of regulation, investors
continued taking on more risk than they understood.20
13. see CRISIS TIMELINE, supra note 4, at 1, 11.
14. See WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 24.
15. The End of the Affair: America's Return to Thrift Presages a Long and Deep Recession,
ECONoMisT, Nov. 20, 2008.
16. See Jackson's Holes, EcONOMIST, Aug. 20, 2009, at 68. For further observations about certain
elements of macroeconomic policy that could have contributed to the GFC 08/09, see IMF, Research
Department, Lessons of the Global Crisis for Macroeconomic Policy (Feb. 19, 2009), available at https://www.
imf.org/extemal/np/pp/eng/2009/021909.pdf.
17. See WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 22.
18. IMF, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, Lessons of the Financial Crisis for Future
Regulation of Financial Institutions and Markets and for Liquidity Management, at 3 (Feb. 4, 2009), available
at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/020409.pdf [hereinafter lMF Regulation Lessons].
19. Id.
20. One source, focusing on derivatives markets, expressed it this way: 'The multitrillion-dollar market
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A fourth problem thought to have led to the crisis was the increased use of
complex financial products. These products involved, among other things, the
bundling of subprime mortgages into mortgage-backed securities or
collateralized debt obligations (which included debt other than mortgages, such
as car and student loans) and the use of credit default swaps (a form of credit
insurance).2 1
With the array of ailments reflected in the foregoing (partial) list of underlying
causes, it is perhaps no wonder the GFC 08/09 could explode with the spark of
one or more specific triggering events. As indicated in the timeline appearing in
subsection A above, several such triggers in fact occurred, thereby transforming
potential chaos into actual chaos. But perhaps the most visible and catastrophic
single event was the collapse of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008. One
observer has characterized that event as follows:
In the early hours of Monday, 15 September, the 185-year-old Wall
Street institution [Lehman Brothers] officially declared itself insolvent
with a filing for chapter 11 protection against its creditors. It was a very
public bankruptcy-all weekend, television crews had stationed
themselves outside Lehman's office, snatching footage of downcast
employees emerging with boxes full of personal belongings. The event
brought out attention-seekers-one man stationed himself outside
Lehman's building with a red flag, shouting: "The capitalist order is in
freefall collapse!"
It was well known that Lehman, an Alabama cotton trader turned
banking behemoth, was the biggest bankruptcy in US history. But
nobody anticipated quite what would follow-a week that has become
known on Wall Street as the great panic of 2008.23
in derivatives was a major catalyst of the financial crisis. Derivatives are supposed to help investors and
businesses manage risk, but after a 2000 law largely deregulated them, they also became tools for vast
speculation, creating and amplifying risk instead of reducing it." Editorial, Reforming the Financial System,
N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 14, 2009, at A20.
21. These are discussed more fully in subsection V(A), below. See infra text accompanying note 182.
22. For another brief enumeration of underlying causes of the GFC 08/09, including several of the
elements noted above, see C. Fred Bergsten, The Dollar and the Deficits: How Washington Can Prevent the
Next Crisis, 88 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 20 (2009) (asserting that the role of the US dollar "as the dominant
international currency has made it much easier for the United States to finance, and thus run up, large trade and
current account deficits ... [creating] huge inflows of foreign capital ... [that] turned out to be an important
cause of the current economic crisis, because they contributed to the low interest rates, excessive liquidity, and
loose monetary polices that-in combination with lax financial supervision-brought on the overleveraging and
underpricing of risk that produced the meltdown.").
23. Andrew Clark, How the Collapse of Lehman Brothers Pushed Capitalism to the Brink, THE
GUARDIAN, Sept. 4, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/sep/04/lehman-brothers-aftershocks-28-
days; see also The Long Climb, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that "the day Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy,
the world economy fell off a precipice.").
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Another account paints an equally grim picture of the consequences of
Lehman Brothers' collapse in September 2008:
Lehman's failure created enormous pain. It spawned a panic in the
commercial-paper, credit-derivatives and bank-funding markets that
dramatically worsened banks' liquidity. Capital and trade flows
collapsed. A vicious spiral of credit withdrawal, weakening growth and
debt impairment ensued. In July 2008 the IMF thought the world
economy would grow by 3.9% in 2009. [But as of September 2009, the
IMF] thinks it will shrink by 1.4%.24
C. Immediate Responses in the United States
As shown in the above timeline, there have been several key points at which
the U.S. government has taken specific action in response to the GFC 08/09.
Perhaps the three most significant ones are: (i) the July 2008 Federal Reserve
Board's authorization of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to lend to Fanny
Mae and Freddy Mac; (ii) the September 2008 move to bail out AIG; and (iii) the
October 2008 establishment of the Troubled Asset Relief Program.
The first of these, the announcement of backing for Fanny Mae and Freddy
Mac, was intended to show government support of the two agencies. Only a few
21
weeks later, these two agencies were placed in government conservatorship.
In establishing the TARP, Congress authorized the purchase of 700 billion
dollars worth of troubled assets. In November 2008, Ford, General Motors
("GM"), and Chrysler asked for TARP loans. The U.S. Treasury authorized loans
of up to US$13.4 billion for GM and US$4.0 billion for Chrysler in December.26
D. Damage and Control in Other Countries
As the crisis unfolded in the United States, governments in some other parts
of the world also witnessed their financial systems in chaos and tried to take
protective measures in response." In February 2008, Northern Rock, the United
Kingdom's fifth-largest mortgage lender, was taken into state ownership. The
collapse of all three of Iceland's major banks has made the banking crisis in that
country the largest in economic history. In annualized terms, Japan's GDP fell
15.2% in the first quarter of 2009. In the world's Arab countries, the worst is
possibly still yet to come. Arab banks have reported almost US$4 billion in
24. What If, ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 2009, at 86.
25. See CRisis TIMELINE, supra note 4, at 6.
26. Id. at 9, 12, 14.
27. Except as otherwise noted, the information presented in this paragraph is drawn from Wikipedia,
Financial Crisis of 2007-2010, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilFinancialcrisisof_2007%E2%80%932010 (last
visited Nov. 1, 2009).
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losses due to the crisis," and unemployment rates are projected to go as high as
17%.29
In a great many countries around the world, governments made
unprecedented volumes of public funds available to shore up financial
institutions. According to one estimate, "[b]y the spring of [2009] the world's
governments had injected [US]$432 billion of capital into their banks ... and
guaranteed bank debts worth [US]$4.65 trillion."o
IHl. THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE
The brief account of the GFC 08/09 I have offered above in Section II
highlights some of the key responses made by the government in the birthplace
of the crisis-the United States-and by governments in other countries affected
most directly by the crisis. In addition to these responses by national
governments, however, responses also emerged from international institutions. I
examine those responses in this Section. In doing so, I divide the account into
three segments: (i) the response by the G-20; (ii) the response by the IMF; and
(iii) the response by a few other international institutions, including the World
Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the European Central Bank.
A. Action by the G-20
For many years, the Group of Seven (comprising the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Canada, and Italy) has served as an
informal but powerful forum for economic and financial decision-making." It
appears that the GFC 08/09 might mark the eclipsing of the G-7 (or its partial
successor, the G-8, including Russia) in favor of the G-20, which was originally
set up in September 1999.32 Indeed, the primacy of the G-20 as "the premier
forum for [our] international economic co-operation" was announced at the
gathering of G-20 leaders in September 2009." Whether this shift in influence is
28. Doron Peskin, Recession Costs Arab Banks $4B, INFO-PROD RESEARCH (MIDDLE EAST) LTD., Sep.
25, 2009, http://www.infoprod.co.illarticle/2/295.
29. See Doron Peskin, Unemployment in Arab World a 'Time Bomb', INFO-PROD RESEARCH (MIDDLE
EAST) LTD., Apr. 10, 2009, http://infoprod.co.illmain/siteNew/index.php?langld=1&mod=article&action=
article&Admin=qwas&stId=25 1.
30. Gandhian Banking, ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 2009, at 20.
31. For an interesting account of the various groupings of countries that have arisen over the years, see
Alan S. Alexandroff, G-8? G-20? G-x?: The Library Group Grows Up, COURIER, Summer 2009, at 8, available
at http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/articles.cfm?id=580.
32. IMF Regulation Lessons, supra note 18, at 7. The G-20 was established in the wake of the Asian
financial crisis to provide "a permanent forum for broadening the dialogue on issues of international financial
stability between advanced and major emerging economies. Its membership consists of 19 systemically
important countries and the European Union, which together account for two-thirds of the world's population
and nine-tenths of the global gross national product." Id. (footnote omitted)
33. Richard Wray, World Leaders Relaunch G20 as Top Economic Forum, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 25,
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permanent or not, the fact remains that the G-20 has taken a lead role in
coordinating efforts at the national level to address international aspects of the
GFC 08/09.
The following paragraphs highlight three specific aspects of the G-20's work
in this regard: (i) instructions issued by the G-20 to national authorities in terms
of fiscal stimulus and financial regulation; (ii) instructions issued by the G-20 to
national authorities in terms of resisting protectionist temptations and pressures;
and (iii) instructions issued by the G-20 to the IMF regarding its role in the
containment of, and recovery from, the crisis.
1. Financial Regulation and Fiscal Stimulus
On November 15, 2008, at its summit in Washington, D.C., the G-20 called
on national governments to take these steps relating to the provision of fiscal
stimulus and to the regulation of financial institutions within their jurisdictions:"
* Request their finance ministers to review accounting standards,
executive compensation, financial risk management, the systemic
risk of credit derivatives, the mandates/governance/resources of the
IMF and other international financial institutions, and to report back
with additional recommendations;
* Improve accounting (valuation) and disclosure standards, especially
for complex financial instruments, and to require enhanced
disclosure of risks on a timely basis from financial institutions;
* Undertake a financial sector assessment program and report its
results;
* Review their bankruptcy systems to ensure adequacy for winding
down large multinational financial firms;
* Strengthen their capital requirements for financial institutions;
* Improve their mechanisms for international cooperation and
information-sharing among their national regulators; and
* Create "supervisory colleges" to meet regularly, supervise, and
discuss risks with "all major cross-border financial institutions."
2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/25/g20-reform-pittsburg-developing-nations.
34. For further details on G-20 initiatives on some of these points, see IMF Regulation Lessons, supra
note 18, at 7.
35. The following list is drawn from the declaration emerging from the G-20 meeting in Washington.
The Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors [G-20], Declaration: Summit on
Financial Markets and the World Economy (Nov. 15, 2008), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/
g20-summit-declaration.pdf [hereinafter G-20 Washington Declaration].
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On April 2, 2009, at its London summit, the G-20 called on national
governments to take these additional steps relating to the provision of fiscal
stimulus and to the regulation of financial institutions within their jurisdictions:"
* Ensure the strength of their domestic regulatory systems and
establish greater regulatory consistency and cooperation with each
other;
* Extend regulation and oversight to the shadow-banking sector (that
is, "all systemically important financial institutions, instruments and
markets"), explicitly including hedge funds;
* "[E]xtend regulatory oversight .. . to Credit Rating Agencies;"
* Improve the capital in the banking system and limit excessive
leverage, as well to agree to a single set of global accounting
standards; and
* Take action and deploy sanctions against non-cooperative
jurisdictions and tax havens.
On September 25, 2009, at the Pittsburgh summit, the G-20 requested
national governments to take these further actions regarding fiscal stimulus and
financial regulation: 7
* Pledge to avoid prematurely ending stimulus and to withdraw
extraordinary support in a coordinated way;
* Commit to developing international rules to raise capital standards
and discourage excessive leverage by the end of 2010, with
implementation phased in by the end of 2012;
* Commit all major financial centers to adopting the Basel II Capital
Framework by 2011;
* Require that all standardized over-the-counter derivatives be traded
on exchanges/electronic platforms, cleared through central
counterparties, and reported to central repositories by the end of
2012, with non-standardized ones subject to higher capital
requirements;
* Call on international accounting bodies to produce a single set of
global accounting standards by June 2011; and
36. The following list is drawn from: G-20, London Communiqu6, The Global Plan for Recovery and
Reform (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf [hereinafter G-20
London Communique].
37. The following list is drawn from the declaration emerging from the G-20 meeting in Pittsburgh. G-
20, Leaders' Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, (Sept. 24-25, 2009), available at http://www.g20.org/
Documents/pittsburgh-summit_1eaders statement_250909.pdf [hereinafter G-20 Pittsburgh Statement].
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* Phase out and rationalize inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, and to
report implementation strategies for this at the next G-20 meeting.
2. Trade Liberalization
In addition to pressing their governments to take decisive action in the areas
of financial regulation and fiscal stimulus, the G-20 leaders have, in all three of
the G-20 crisis-period summits, warned against the dangers of protectionism,
especially in the area of trade and investment. For example, at its November
2008 summit in Washington, D.C., the G-20 called on national governments to
31take these steps
* Commit not to raise new barriers to investment or trade, new export
restrictions, or WTO-inconsistent measures to boost exports, for the
next twelve months; and
* "Strive to reach agreement this year on modalities that leads to a
successful conclusion" of the Doha Round.
Similar pleas were made (with time horizons extended each time) at the
London and Pittsburgh summits, 39 and another related element-to agree to
minimize negative effects on trade by fiscal policies and financial sector
supports-was added at the London sunmnit.4 0
3. Reliance on a Strengthened IMF
The attention of the G-20 leaders was directed not only at national authorities
but also at other international institutions, and especially at the IMF. At each of
the three G-20 crisis-period summits, the IMF was called upon to take measures
that would assist national governments in fighting the crisis, and also to take
steps that would strengthen the legitimacy and effectiveness of the IMF itself.
For example, at the November 2008 G-20 summit in Washington, the leaders
announced that it had done the following:
* Requested that the IMF provide recommendations to mitigate pro-
cyclicality, including a review of the effects of policies regarding
leverage, capital requirements, executive compensation, etc.;
* Asked the IMF to improve its cooperation with the Financial
Stability Forum,41 to better integrate regulatory responses and
economic surveillance;
38. See G-20 Washington Declaration, supra note 35.
39. See G-20 London Communiqud, supra note 36, G-20 Pittsburgh Statement, supra note 37.
40. See G-20 London Communiqud, supra note 36.
41. The Financial Stability Forum ("FSF') was convened in April 1999 "to promote international
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* Requested that the IMF take a lead role in drawing lessons from the
crisis;
* Undertook a review of the adequacy of financial support for the IMF
and other international financial institutions, looking towards
increasing it where necessary;
* Called on the IMF to conduct vigorous surveillance reviews of
countries, to integrate these with the IMF-World Bank joint reviews
of countries' financial sectors, and to provide capacity-building
programs to aid developing countries in formulating and
implementing new regulations; and
* Called for the reform of the IMF and other Bretton Woods
institutions to reflect changing economic weights and to give more
voice to developing countries.42
Likewise, at the April 2009 London summit, the G-20 focused attention on
the IMF's role in handling the GFC 08/09. In that case, issues of financing and
legitimacy took center stage, as the G-20 announced that it had taken these steps:
* Agreed to measures that would result in a tripling of resources
available to the IMF in the form of immediate financing from
members (up to US$750 billion), via expanded New Arrangements
to Borrow;
* Agreed to support a new SDR allocation (that is, creating additional
quantities of Special Drawing Rights, the IMF's reserve "currency")
amounting to the equivalent of US$250 billion;
* Urged the IMF to use additional resources from a previously-planned
sale of IMF gold holdings to provide US$6 billion in concessional
lending to the poorest countries;
* Pledged to support "candid, even-handed, and independent" IMF
surveillance of members' economies, financial sectors, and policy
impacts on other countries, as well as of global economic risks;
* Asked the IMF, along with the newly-formed Financial Stability
Board, to provide "early warning" of macroeconomic and financial
risks, and to prescribe the policies needed to address them;
financial stability through information exchange and international co-operation in financial supervision and
surveillance." IMF Regulation Lessons, supra note 18, at 6. The FSF "brings together finance ministries, central
banks, regulators and supervisory authorities from major financial centres." Id. In October 2007 the FSF
established a senior working group to examine the causes and weaknesses that produced what became the GFC
08/09; and in April 2008 the FSF set out an agenda for regulatory reforms that focused on strengthening
prudential oversight, capital and liquidity standards, the use of credit ratings, and other points. Id. For further
details on the FSF - and on its successor, the Financial Stability Board ("FSB")-see also infra notes 193, 218,
and accompanying text.
42. See G-20 Washington Declaration, supra note 35.
60
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 23
* Asked the IMF to implement the reforms regarding quotas and
"voice" for member countries, as agreed upon in April 2008, and to
complete the next IMF quota review by January 2011;
* Agreed to "give consideration" to greater involvement of IMF
governors in providing the IMF direction and accountability; and
* Agreed that the top leadership of the IMF, along with that of other
international financial institutions, should be selected through an
"open, transparent, and merit-based" process.
The G-20 leaders gave further attention to IMF-related matters when they
gathered in Pittsburgh for the September 2009 summit. The statement issued at
the conclusion of that meeting reported that the G-20 had taken these additional
steps:
* Committed to a shift in IMF quotas of at least five percent from
currently over-represented to under-represented countries;
* Asked the IMF to assist G-20 members in developing mutual
forward-looking assessments of whether G-20 countries' individual
policies are collectively consistent with one another and with
sustainable, balanced economic growth;
* Asked the IMF to report regularly to both the G-20 and the IMF's
own International Monetary and Finance Committee on global
economic developments, global patterns of growth, and suggested
policy adjustments;
* Tasked the IMF with providing a report at the next G-20 meeting
regarding options for requiring the financial sector to contribute
toward paying the burden of government interventions in order to
repair the banking system."
I would offer this summary of the role and initiatives of the G-20 in
addressing the GFC 08/09: In three main respects, the G-20 took dramatic steps,
thereby asserting its prominent role in international economic cooperation going
forward. First, it pressed its member governments to use robust and coordinated
fiscal and regulatory initiatives to arrest the chaos being caused by the crisis and
to set the stage for a recovery. Second, it reasserted the importance of taking such
measures without resorting to protectionism-especially trade protectionism of a
sort that would spell the end of efforts to complete the Doha round of
negotiations. Third, the G-20 breathed new life and purpose into the IMF,
simultaneously vesting in the IMF broad responsibilities for collaborative action
and greatly enhanced lending activity, and insisting on prompt completion of
43. See G-20 London Communiqud, supra note 36.
44. See G-20 Pittsburgh Statement, supra note 37.
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substantial reforms in governance and participation within the organization. Let
us now examine how the IMF has responded to the new challenges issued to it-
not only those coming from the G-20 in recent months, but those coming from
other sources as well.
B. The IMF: Reform and Reactivation
As I indicated at the beginning of this article, a key aim of this subsection on
the "international institutional response" to the GFC 08/09 is to discern and
assess how the IMF, which by anyone's estimation surely plays a key role in
international economic management, has responded to the crisis. To do this, I
look first at a number of the recent reforms undertaken by the IMF in the dozen
years since the Asian financial crisis erupted in 1997, and then I describe some
new reforms now underway.
1. Recent IMF Reforms-1997-2008
In subsection HI(C)(2) below, I offer a brief account of the Asian financial
crisis, which serves as the most recent precedent for the GFC 08/09. I shall not
preempt that discussion here, but I do wish to highlight the significance of the
Asian financial crisis in concentrating an enormous amount of attention on the
IMF. As I have explained more fully in a companion article to this one,45 the
increased scrutiny of the IMF in the late 1990s resulted in four particular
criticisms (among others, of course), which may be stated generally as follows:
* Bad Medicine. "The IMF prescribes economic and financial policies
that fail to cure, and that indeed often make sicker, its borrowing
member countries and the entire world economy."
* Distributional and Social Injustice. "The economic and financial
policies that the IMF insists on create distributional inequities and
ignore the social aspects of a country's well-being."
* IMF Secrecy and Opaqueness. "The IMF is a closed, non-transparent
organization that operates in secret, despite its insistence on
transparency in the governments of its members."
* The IMF Democracy Deficit. "Controlled by a handful of rich
countries, the IMF is an unaccountable autocracy in which the people
most affected by its operations have far too little chance to
participate or exert influence."4
45. Head-2010, supra note 3.
46. This enumeration of criticisms draws from a book I wrote in 2008. See JOHN W. HEAD, LOSING THE
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT WAR: A CONTEMPORARY CRITIQUE OF THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK, AND THE WTO
(2008) [hereinafter HEAD-2008]. I examined these four criticisms of the IIMF, together with numerous other
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By examining how the IMF has responded to these four criticisms in the
dozen years since the Asian financial crisis occurred, perhaps we can gauge to
what extent the IMF was in some "state of readiness" to address the GFC 08/09
when it erupted in 2008. My own assessment is that the reforms made during that
time did, in fact, help prepare the IMF for this new challenge.
The reforms I refer to can be divided into: (i) reforms in IMF operations; and
(ii) reforms in IMF accountability and governance. The following paragraphs
identify several major operational reforms.
One change in IMF operations-designed specifically to address the sort of
"contagion" issues that arose so dangerously in the context of the Asian financial
crisis-is the establishment in 1999 of a new source of financing called the
Contingent Credit Line ("CCL"). The CCL was designed to provide "a means by
which the IMF could provide ... a member country that is pursuing strong
economic policies [an opportunity] to obtain financing on a short-term basis
when faced by a sudden and disruptive loss of market confidence because of
contagion from difficulties in other countries." 47 Although the CCL expired in
2003, a new instrument designed to serve similar purposes was recently
established. That facility, called the Flexible Credit Line ("FCL"), also aims to
help countries with very strong fundamentals, policies, and track records of
policy implementation; like the CCL, the FCL is particularly useful for crisis
prevention purposes. Access to financing under the FCL "is determined on a
case-by-case basis, is not subject to the normal access limits, and is available in a
single up-front disbursement rather than phased."48 In addition, disbursements
under the FCL are not made conditional upon the borrower's implementation of
prescribed policy commitments, as is the case under certain other types of IMF
financing. Moreover, "[t]here is flexibility to draw on the credit line at the time it
is approved," or the country may treat it as precautionary.49 In short, the IMF has
created new forms of lending that can guard against some of the worst aspects of
financial crises.
Another change in IMF operations came in 2005 when the IMF introduced "a
new kind of instrument-Policy Support Instrument-designed for low-income
countries that do not currently need or want IMF financing but do wish to have
criticisms of that institution and other international economic institutions in that 2008 book as well as in a 2005
book that I wrote for an academic and research audience. See JOHN W. HEAD, THE FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS: AN EVALUATION OF CRITICISMS LEVELED AT THE IMF, THE MULTILATERAL
DEVELOPMENT BANKS, AND THE WTO (Series on Int'l Law & Dev., 2005) [hereinafter HEAD-2005]. Various
other criticisms that I identified in those earlier two works do not, in my experience, appear as frequently in the
literature regarding the IMF's handling of the Asian financial crisis as do the four criticisms referred to above.
47. See HEAD-2008, supra note 46, at 108; see also HEAD-2005, supra note 46, at 24-25.
48. IMF, Factsheet: IMF Lending (Sept. 9, 2009), http://www.imf.org/extemal/nplexr/facts/howl
end.htm.
49. Id. For example, Mexico entered into an FCL arrangement in April 2009 and announced at the time
that it intended to treat the arrangement as precautionary and did not intend to draw on the line of credit. See
Press Release, IMF, IMF Executive Board Approves US47 Billion Arrangement for Mexico Under the Flexible
Credit Line, No. 09/130 (Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/pr/2009/pr09130.htm.
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IMF endorsement of their economic and financial policies, and to provide advice
and monitoring in connection with those policies."'o A country's agreement with
the IMF on such a Policy Support Instrument signals potential donors and
financial markets that the "country's policies have been discussed with the IMF;
this can, in turn, help a country boost its international reputation for financial
prudence[," and hence its ability to attract financing on attractive terms.-"
Related to these initiatives aimed specifically at crisis prevention are two
other recent operational changes undertaken by the IMF. In 2006, the IMF began
engaging in multilateral consultations-the first one involved the Euro Area,
Japan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States-focusing on how global imbalances
can be addressed while maintaining robust global growth.52 More fundamentally,
changes were put in place in 2006 for more intensive economic surveillance at
both the country level and the regional level. As components of the new
"Medium-Term Strategy" introduced by former Managing Director Rodrigo de
Rato, these changes are aimed at doing more to identify and promote effective
responses to threats to economic stability. "Moreover, a new model, the 'Global
Economy Model"' was developed and launched by the IMF in 2004 to provide a
better instrument for evaluating the effectiveness of various national economic
and financial policies.""
Another major change in IMF operations came in 2002 with the adoption of
new guidelines on conditionality. The new guidelines on conditionality, replacing
a set that had been in place since 1979, were designed to reflect four principles:
(i) the need to enhance the borrowing country's "ownership" of the policy
reforms; (ii) the need to reduce the number of conditions; (iii) the need to tailor
the policy programs (and hence the content of the conditionalities) more closely
to the borrowing country's circumstances; and (iv) the need to improve clarity in
the specification of conditions.54
50. HEAD-2008, supra note 46, at 113.
51. HEAD-2008, supra note 46, at 113; see also IMF, Factsheet: The Policy Support Instrument (Nov.
2008), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/psi.htm.
52. See IMF, The Multilateral Consultation on Global Imbalances, Apr. 2007, http://www.imf.org/
external/np/exr/ib/2007/041807.htm.
53. See HEAD-2008, supra note 46, at 180; see generally IMF, Research Department, GEM: A New
International Macroeconomic Model (Jan. 2004), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/res/gem/
2004/eng/012304.pdf (providing reasons for the creation of the Global Economy Model, including detailed
analysis of its features).
54. See IMF, Legal and Policy Development and Review Departments, Guidelines on Conditionality
(Sept. 25, 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/External/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/guid/092302.htm. The
changes in the IMF conditionality guidelines were praised by Allan Meltzer, the chairman of the commission
that in 2000 voiced strenuous criticisms at the IMF. See Allan H. Meltzer, The IFIAC Report: Comments on the
Critics, in THE IMF AND ITS CRITICS: REFORM OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE 122 (David Vines &
Christopher L. Gilbert, eds., 2004).
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Another form of operational reform in the IMF-this one responding to the
"distributional and social injustice" criticism summarized above"-revolves
around a set of steps the IMF has taken in recent years to give special attention to
the social aspects of a country's well-being. In urging governments to provide
such protections, the IMF has advanced the view (in one of its numerous "social
dimensions" publications) that one of the elements in a strategy of high-quality
growth for a country is "sound social policies, including social safety nets to
protect the poor during the period of economic reform, cost-effective basic social
expenditures, and employment-generating labor market policies." Likewise, in
its 2003 annual report, the IMF offered this description of how social issues bear
on its operations:
The IMF is committed to integrating poverty and social impact analysis
in programs supported by lending under the [IMF's Poverty Reduction
and Growth Facility]. The purpose of this analysis is to assess the
implications of key policy measures on the well-being of different social
groups, especially the vulnerable and the poor.
When analysis indicates that a particular measure (for example, currency
devaluation) may harm the poor, the impact is addressed through the
choice or timing of policies, the development of countervailing
measures, or social safety nets.
That same report listed some of the safety nets built into IMF-supported
programs: "subsidies or cash compensation for particularly vulnerable groups;
improved distribution of essential commodities, such as medicines; temporary
55. See supra text accompanying note 46.
56. IMF, IMF Pamphlet Series No. 47, Social Dimensions of the IMF's Policy Dialogue 1 (Mar. 6-12,
1995), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/pam/pam47/pam47sum.htm.
57. IMF, Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial Year Ended April 30, 2003, 44 (2003)
[hereinafter IMF Annual Report 2003], available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/ar/2003/eng/index.
htm. The report goes on to list some of the safety nets built into IMF-supported programs: "subsidies or cash
compensation for particularly vulnerable groups; improved distribution of essential commodities, such as
medicines; temporary price controls on some essential commodities; severance pay and retraining for public
sector employees who have lost their jobs; and employment through public works programs." Id. For a couple
of decades, "numerous IMF-supported programs have been designed to provide specific protections for the
poorest consumers and workers in borrowing member countries." Details on these are available in numerous
IMF publications and website entries, as well as in HEAD-2005, supra note 46, at 82. For further information
about IMF policies in this regard, see generally IMF, Factsheet: Poverty and Social Impact Analysis of
Economic Policies (Apr. 2008), available at http://www.i mf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sia.htm; IMF, Factsheet:
Social Dimensions of the IMF's Policy Dialogue (Mar. 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/extemalnp/
exr/facts/social.htm. For a discussion of issues relating to distributional justice, undertaken immediately after
the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis, see generally IMF, IMF Fiscal Affairs Department, Should Equity Be
A Goal of Economic Policy?, JAN. 1999, available at http://www.imf.org/exteriial/pubs/ft/issues/issuesl6/
index.htm. It is perhaps worth noting that IMF attention to such issues dates back even a decade earlier. See
generally Peter S. Heller, A. Lans Bovenberg, Thanos Catsambas, Ke-Young Chu, and Partharsarathi Shome,
IMF Occasional Paper Series No. 58, The Implications of Fund-Supported Adjustment Programs for Poverty
(May, 1988).
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price controls on some essential commodities; severance pay and retraining for
public sector employees who have lost their jobs; and employment through
public works programs.""
The IMF's several lending mechanisms that aim directly at economically
disadvantaged countries further demonstrate the attention the IMF now pays to
social issues and distributional fairness. Just after the Asian financial crisis, the
IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility ("PRGF"), designed to provide
low-cost loans to poor countries, was created (from older programs created after
the 1982 debt crisis), and was later supplemented in 2005 with the Exogenous
Shocks Facility ("ESF")-also aimed expressly at low-income countries. These
two facilities can be summarized in this way:
* Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (1999). Provides longer-term
assistance for deep-seated, structural balance of payments
difficulties; aims at sustained, poverty-reducing growth. ...
* Exogenous Shocks Facility (2005). ... to provide policy support and
finance assistance to low-income countries facing exogenous shocks
(commodity price changes, trade disruptions from neighboring
country, etc.); available to countries eligible for the PRGF but
without a PRGF-supported program in place.59
In 2009 the IMF announced that these two facilities would be further
enhanced to provide additional support for low-income member countries. I
explain these very recent changes below, in subsection B(2), discussing the
"reactivation" of the IMF.
In yet another operational change designed to address the "distributional and
social injustice" criticism-in addition, that is, to these funding techniques
established to provide special favorable terms for low-income borrowing
countries-the IMF has also helped create and implement the Multilateral Debt
Relief Initiative aimed at canceling debt claims that the IMF holds on certain
countries. As of 2006, the IMF had already canceled the debts owed to it by
nineteen poor countriesi6 Another special program for poor countries is the
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries ("HIPC") initiative, under which the
international financial community reduces the overall external debt of poor
countries in the most debt.'
58. IMF Annual Report 2003, supra note 57, at 44.
59. This summary is drawn from HEAD-2008, supra note 46, at 110. See also IMF, Factsheet: IMF
Lending (Sept. 9, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/facts/howlend.htm.
60. See HEAD-2008, supra note 46, at 116. The figure as of mid-2009 is 26 poor countries. See IMF,
Factsheet: The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) (June 2009), http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/
facts/mdri.htm.
61. See IMF, Factsheet: Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative (Sept.
22, 2009, http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm. The HIPC was created in 1996. Id.
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In sum, in the dozen years since the Asian financial crisis erupted, the IMF
has implemented an impressive array of major reforms that increase its capacity
to respond to crisis situations in a way that takes social and distributional justice
issues into account.62
Another reform in IMF operations warrants some mention. This reform
responds to the "secrecy and opaqueness" criticism mentioned above.
Especially in the last decade, the IMF has undertaken an impressive campaign to
provide more information on its operations.6 Now the IMF regularly posts on its
website the reports of Article IV consultations-that is, the consultations the IMF
holds annually (under the auspices of Article IV of the IMF Charter) with each of
its member countries regarding economic and financial developments. The IMF
website also provide the letters of intent and associated documentation relating to
standby arrangements and other IMF lending operations, as well as information
about each member's financial position with the IMF and a range of details about
the IMF's own financial position. Indeed, according to a recent entry on the
IMF's website, ninety-five percent of members now choose to release their letters
to the IMF regarding their requests for use of IMF resources. Similarly, three-
quarters of all stand-alone reports on IMF-supported programs were published in
the half-decade starting in 2001, with the pace of those releases increasing over
time. The IMF now posts information on its website about each member's
financial position with the IMF, quarterly IMF financial statements, and other
information about administrative and operational aspects of the IMF.
Having summarized several operational reforms undertaken by the IMF in
recent years, let me turn now to some reforms in the IMF's accountability and
governance that had already been undertaken before the GFC 08/09 erupted.
These reforms reflect the IMF's response to the "democracy deficit" criticism
summarized above."
A first initiative in this respect is the IMF's establishment in July 2001 of an
Independent Evaluation Office ("IEO") in order "to conduct objective and
independent assessments of issues of relevance to the mandate of the IMF."66 The
62. There is, however, more that could be done. In another context I have offered specific suggestions
that would, if adopted by the IMF, give it a wider role in insisting that its member countries recognize and
protect human rights. See HEAD-2008, supra note 46, at 203, 297 (urging linkage of IMF operations with
obligations of its members to implement certain treaties, including human rights treaties).
63. See supra text accompanying note 46.
64. Details in the remainder of this paragraph are drawn from HEAD-2005, supra note 46, at 76-77;
HEAD-2008, supra note 46, at 229.
65. See supra text accompanying note 46.
66. IMF Annual Report 2003, supra note 57, at 60; see generally IMF, Independent Evaluation Office of
the IMF, About IEO, http://www.ieo-imf.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2010) (providing further information
about the IEO's history, purpose, structure, and operations, including its official terms of reference, including
IEO annual reports). For some views on the IEO, see generally four short articles by (respectively) an academic,
two former IMF Executive Directors, and a senior official of the NGO Friends of the Earth: Peter B. Kenen,
Appraising the IMF's Performance: A Review of the First Three Studies by the New Independent Evaluation
Office, 41 FIN. & DEV. 41 (2004); Karin Lissakers, Blunt Approach Does the Trick, 41 FIN. & DEv. 46 (2004);
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IEO has already undertaken several evaluation projects, including assessments
of: (i) the IMF's role in the economic crises in Brazil, Indonesia, and Korea; (ii)
the IMF's role in Argentina; (iii) the effectiveness of the IMF's Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility (by which it makes low-cost loans to poor
countries); (iv) IMF technical assistance; (v) the IMF's approach to capital
account liberalization; and (vi) IMF initiatives in the area of corporate
governance. One of its most recent evaluation efforts focuses on the governance
of the IMF-a matter that I shall elaborate on below. In 2006, the IMF's
Executive Board reviewed an external assessment of the IEO itself (a so-called
"evaluation of the evaluators") and decided to continue the IEO in operation with
no major changes.
Although it is too early to assess the long-term impact of the IEO's work,
its very creation does signal a willingness on the part of the IMF to
provide increased public accountability. In its current formulation, the
IEO is largely an internal organ of the IMF, given the fact that the
Director of the IEO is appointed by the IMF Executive Board, may be
dismissed at any time by the Executive Board, hires other IEO officers
on terms and conditions determined by the Board, depends on the
Executive Board for budgetary funding, and reports to the Board.
Although the IEO's terms of reference call for it to 'be independent of
Fund management and staff-a requirement that is given some force by
(1) requiring that a majority of IEO personnel come from outside the
IMF and (2) prohibiting the IEO Director from being appointed to a
regular IMF staff position at the end of his or her term of office- the
IEO, nevertheless, falls short of being an external organ broadly
representative in character, empowered to exercise a fully objective
review of IMF operations and to issue binding orders if it judges those
operations to be improper or ultra vires. "
It is, however, a start toward some sort of "judicial review" of IMF operations.
"A second recent IMF initiative-or, more precisely, a cluster of related
initiatives-to increase the institution's accountability to the citizens of IMF
Jean-Claude Milleron, Enhancing the Learning Culture, 41 FIN. & DEV. 48 (2004); Carol Welch, Credible
Start, Untested Impact, 41 FIN. & DEV. 50 (2004), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/fandd/
2004/03/pdflkenen.pdf. Some of the IEO's reports have criticized IMF operations. IMF, Independent Evaluation
Office, The IMF and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.imf.orglexternal/np/ieo/
2007/ssaleng/pdf/report.pdf (finding "ambiguity and confusion" about the IMF's policies and practices in its
work in sub-Saharan Africa); IMF, Progress Report on the Activities of the Independent Evaluation Office
(IEO) (Oct. 2, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/pp/eng/2009/100209.pdf (criticizing IMF
operations and finding that the IMF needed to "play a larger and more considered role" in three areas: whether
and how countries should liberalize trade in financial services, the systemic implications of the proliferation of
preferential trade agreements, and the global effects of trade policies in systemically important countries).
67. For specific citations to sources relied on in this paragraph, including pertinent provisions in the
regulations governing the IEO, see HEAD-2005, supra note 46, at 86-87.
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consumer countries centers on the notion of 'voice.""' In order to increase the
"voice" (notwithstanding the tiny voting strengths) of many member
governments in IMF deliberations steps were taken in 1999 to give broader
authority to the IMF's International Monetary and Financial Committee, which is
a group of twenty-four Governors that gather twice a year to provide policy
oversight to the Executive Board. The aim of establishing this group was to
provide "greater direct involvement of governments in the policy-making process
within the Fund."69
In a similar effort to strengthen the "voice" of developing countries, as well
as non-government entities and individuals within those countries, the IMF's
Executive Board continues to develop the IMF's Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper ("PRSP") process, introduced in 1999, by which written plans for reducing
poverty are prepared by low-income countries through a participatory process
involving domestic stakeholders and external development partners. Moreover,
as yet another effort to strengthen the "voice" of the most thinly-represented
countries, the IMF's Executive Board is undertaking efforts to address staffing
and technological constraints of the two sub-Saharan African constituencies on
the Executive Board.
In addition to these various initiatives to increase the "voice" of some of its
smaller member countries, the IMF has also begun to make changes in the
distribution of voting power. Although the weighted voting system itself is still in
place, a first round of adjustments was made in 2006 to increase, on an ad hoc
basis, the quotas (and therefore voting power) of four member countries: China,
Korea, Mexico, and Turkey.o
68. The account in this paragraph and the following paragraph is drawn from HEAD-2008, supra note
46, at 237-38.
69. Frangois Gianviti, The Reform of the International Monetary Fund (Conditionality and
Surveillance), 34 INT'L LAW 107, 115 (2000).
70. An IMF "Factsheet" issued in August 2009 (and available on the IMF website) reports as follows
regarding the portion of the Medium-Term Strategy that relates to quotas and voting power:
On April 28, 2008, a large-scale quota and voice reform in the making for nearly two years was adopted
by a large margin by the Board of Governors of the IMF. It aims to make quotas more responsive to
economic realities by increasing the representation of fast-growing economies and at the same time giving
low-income countries more say in the IMF's decision making. The reform builds on an initial step agreed
by the IMF's membership in September 2006 to have ad hoc quota increases for four countries-China,
Korea, Mexico, and Turkey.
See IMF, Factsheet: IMF Quotas (Aug. 31, 2009), http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm. For
information on the Board of Governors resolution of April 2007 requesting work on a Charter amendment, see
Press Release, IMF, IMF Board of Governors Approves Quota and Related Governance Reforms, No. 06/205
(Sep. 18, 2006), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2006/pr06205.htm.; IMF, IMF in Focus,
Setting a New Course, (Sep. 2006, at 7), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/survey/2006/0901
06.pdf for a summary of the IMF's Medium-Term Strategy. For details about the charter amendment currently
under consideration, see infra note 86 and accompanying text.
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2. The IMF "Reactivation" Starting in 2008
Above, I have offered some details about reforms the IMF has undertaken in
recent years-in terms of both the IMF's operations and its accountability and
governance-in order to gauge to what extent the IMF was in some "state of
readiness" to address the GFC 08/09 when it erupted in 2008. After all, it is clear
from various G-20 actions and communiqu6s that the IMF has been called on to
take a leading role in addressing the crisis, nurturing a recovery, and reducing the
chances of a recurrence.' I refer to this as the "reactivation" of the IMF.
It is worth noting that this "reactivation" has come on the heels of a period in
which the IMF had become substantially less active-so much so that it was
scrambling as recently as the beginning of 2007 to find means of generating
income to cover its operating expenses in the wake of a substantial drop in its
lending volumes.72 Now, the IMF's lending volumes have shot skyward again.
For example, the loans made available to members out of the IMF's General
Resources Account increased from about SDR1 billion in 2007 to over SDR13
billion in 2008, and already stood at nearly SDR17.7 billion for just the first three
quarters of 2009." Large (sometimes massive) IMF loan commitments have been
made since November 2008 to Iceland, Hungary, Mexico, Bosnia &
Herzegovina, Serbia, Romania, Pakistan, Ukraine, Sri Lanka, Latvia, Belarus,
and Colombia.74
It seems that the IMF intends for this increased lending volume to continue;
in April 2009, for example, the IMF doubled the "access limits"-that is, the
amount of funds a country can borrow from the IMF-for its poorest member
countries. Indeed, an extensive reformulation and expansion of IMF lending to
low-income countries planned for implementation in late 2009 has been
undertaken in response to the GFC 08/09. The changes involve the use of a
trust-the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust-which itself will have three
facilities. The new regime has been described this way:
To make its financial support more flexible and tailored to the diversity
of low-income countries, the IMF has established a new Poverty
71. See subsection B11A3, supra; see also IMF, IMF Survey Magazine, G-20 Reaffirms IMF's Central
Role in Combating Crisis (Apr. 3, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2009/
NEW040309A.htm.
72. See HEAD-2008, supra note 46, at 116 (explaining that the drop in lending necessitated a call for
proposals from a "Committee of Eminent Persons" as to how the IMF could meet its institutional funding
needs).
73. See IMF, IMF Financial Activities-Update December 31, 2008 tbl.1, available at http://www.imf.
org/external/np/tre/activity/2008/123108.htm; IMF, IMF Financial Activities-Update October 1, 2009 tbl. 1,
available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/tre/activity/2009/100109.htm#tbl.
74. For information on current IMF lending, see IMF, IMF Lending at a Glance, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/map/lending/index.htm.
75. See Press Release, IMF, IMF Executive Board Approves Doubling of Borrowing Limits for Poorest
Countries, No. 09/138 (Apr. 23, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/pr/2009/prO9l38.htm.
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Reduction and Growth Trust, which has three new lending windows. The
new windows, which are expected to become effective later in 2009
when donor countries have given their final consent, are
The Extended Credit Facility (ECF), which replaces the Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). The ECF
Provides sustained engagement in case of medium-term balance of
payments needs
Should be based on a country's own poverty reduction strategy, and
Offers more flexible timing requirements than the PRGF for
countries to produce a formal poverty reduction strategy document.
The Standby Credit Facility (SCF) , replacing the Exogenous Shocks
Facility's High Access Component, is similar to the Stand-By
Arrangement for middle-income countries. The SCF
Provides flexible support to low-income countries with short-term
financing and adjustment needs caused by domestic or external
shocks, or policy slippages
Targets countries that no longer face protracted balance of payments
problems but may need help from time to time, and
Can also be used on a precautionary basis to provide insurance.
The Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) , which
Provides limited financial support in a single, up-front payout for
low-income countries facing urgent financing needs
Substitutes for a regular IMF loan when use of the other two
facilities, which involve one-to three-year policy programs, is either
not necessary or not possible, and
Offers highly flexible financing that provides single-use loans that
replace the Exogenous Shocks Facility's Rapid Access Component
and the subsidized Emergency Natural Disaster Assistance; and
offers successive drawings for countries in post-conflict or other
fragile situations, replacing and expanding subsidized Emergency
Post-Conflict Assistance.
For policy advice and signaling to donors, countries can request non-
financial assistance under the existing Policy Support Instrument (PSI),
which
Supports low-income countries that have secured macroeconomic
stability and thus do not need IMF financial assistance, and
Can provide accelerated access to the new SCF in case of subsequent
financial needs.
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Low-income countries will receive exceptional forgiveness through end-
2011 on all interest payments due to the IMF under its concessional
lending instruments.
Increased IMF financial support for low-income countries has been
joined by changes in the design and assembly of the agreed policy
packages-called programs-that accompany IMF loans. These changes
aim to
Strengthen the focus on supporting poverty alleviation and growth,
for all these programs
Protect public spending even as economic downswings cut revenues
Prioritize national budgets in the direction of spending targeted at the
poor, and
Focus loan conditions on critical areas, such as transparent
71
management of public resources.
These changes aimed at low-income countries supplement a major overhaul
of the IMF's lending practices announced in April 2009, that also include these
other elements:
* Making further changes to IMF conditionality, to depart from the old
practice, under which the IMF now says loans "often had too many
conditions that were insufficiently focused on core objectives";
* Introducing of the Flexible Credit Line described above, thereby
giving qualified countries access to IMF funding with "[n]o hard cap
on access to [IMF] resources" and with longer repayment periods
than in the earlier Supplemental Reserve Facility;
* Enhancing the flexibility of the IMF's regular standby arrangements,
by permitting more front-end access to funds and reducing the
frequency of reviews of a country's performance;
* Continuing to allow countries to exceed the regular access limits-
even after the doubling of the access limits noted above-under so-
called Exceptional Access procedures; and
* Eliminating the "time-based repurchase expectations policy" under
which countries were requested to make repayment before actually
being required to do so-with the ultimate effect of lengthening
grace periods applicable to certain IMF loans."
76. IMF, Factsheet: IMF Support for Low-Income Countries (July 29, 2009), available at http://www.
imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/poor.htm.
77. See IMF, IMF Implements Major Lending Policy Improvements (Mar. 24, 2009), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/fac/2009/032409.htm [hereinafter IMF Lending Improvements]. All quoted
passages in the following bullet-points are drawn from that source.
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In order to attain the increased lending volume that these various reforms
envision, of course, the IMF has had to find new resources. As noted above, the
G-20 called for a tripling of the IMF's borrowed resources." Moreover, in
September 2009, the People's Republic of China agreed to purchase IMF notes in
an amount of US$50 billion to expand the IMF's lending capacity.79 This came
after an agreement that the IMF concluded with Japan in February 2009 under
which Japan made a commitment to lend the IMF up to US$100 billion in an
effort to overcome the global financial crisis.so The European Union also has
committed 75 billion for this purpose.'
In addition, the IMF responded to the G-20's call to create another $250
billion in SDRs." The IMF allocated these in August 2009.83
With such a dramatic "reactivation" as this, the effectiveness of the IMF
will turn on its "state of readiness," which I believe turns in part on how well it
has responded to the criticisms leveled at it in the past. Particularly significant in
this regard is the issue of legitimacy. Above, I have summarized certain changes
made in recent years in IMF accountability and governance, including the recent
increase in voting power of China, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey. Even more
significant change in the distribution of votes is currently in process.
The following list shows the "top ten winners" and the "top ten losers" of
voting power following a proposed second round of ad hoc adjustments:
Increased
China ... increase by 0.88 percentage points, to
a 3.81% share of total voting power
Korea . . . increase by 0.61 percentage points, to
a 1.36% share of total voting power
India ... increase by 0.42 percentage points, to
a 2.34% share of total voting power
Brazil ... increase by 0.31 percentage points, to
a 1.72% share of total voting power
Mexico ... increase by 0.27 percentage points, to
a 1.47% share of total voting power
Spain ... increase by 0.22 percentage points, to
a 1.63% share of total voting power
78. See supra text accompanying note 43.
79. See Press Release, IMF, IMF Signs US $50 Billion Note Purchase Agreement with China, No.
09/293 (Sep. 2, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr09293.htm.
80. See IMF, Factsheet: How to Increase the IMF's Lendable Resources (Apr. 2009), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/facts/imfresources.htm.
81. See IMF Lending Improvements, supra note 77.
82. See supra text accompanying note 43.
83. See Bergsten, supra note 22, at 27. Bergsten states that "[tlhis took SDRs' share of global reserves
from a previous level of under one percent to about five percent." Id.
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. .. increase by 0.18 percentage points, to
a 0.59% share of total voting
... increase by 0.15 percentage points, to
a 0.61% share of total voting power
... increase by 0.13 percentage points, to
a 0.53% share of total voting power
. . . increase by 0.12 percentage points, to
a 6.23% share of total voting power
Decreased
United Kingdom ... decrease by 0.64 percentage points, to
a 4.29% share of total voting power
France . . . decrease by 0.64 percentage points, to
a 4.29% share of total voting power
Saudi Arabia . .. decrease by 0.41 percentage points, to
a 2.80% share of total voting power
Canada . . . decrease by 0.37 percentage points, to
a 2.56% share of total voting power
Russia . . . decrease by 0.35 percentage points, to
a 2.39% share of total voting power
Netherlands . . . decrease by 0.30 percentage points, to
a 2.08% share of total voting power
USA ... decrease by 0.29 percentage points, to
a 16.73% share of total voting power
Belgium ... decrease by 0.26 percentage points, to
a 1.86% share of total voting power
Switzerland . .. decrease by 0.19 percentage points, to
a 1.40% share of total voting power
Australia . .. decrease by 0.18 percentage points, to
a 1.31% share of total voting power4
Another proposed move is to increase the number of "basic votes" for all
member countries, so as to increase the relative voting power of the IMF's
smaller members." This will require an amendment to the IMF Charter and is
currently underway." Indeed, as of late February 2010, sixty-three member
84. See Press Release, IMF, IMF Executive Board Recommends Reforms to Overhaul Quota and Voice,
No. 08/64 (Mar. 28, 2008), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2008/ pr0864.htm [hereinafter
Quota Recommendation]. In describing this second round of adjustments, the IMF explained that its goal was
"to enhance representation for dynamic economies, many of which are emerging market economies, whose
weight and role in the global economy have increased." Id.
85. Id. For an explanation of "basic votes" and the effect of increasing them-a move that several
observers have urged for years-see HEAD-2005, supra note 46, at 89.
86. The text of the proposed amendment itself can be found in Attachment II to the pertinent report of
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countries-including all of the G-7 countries-had already voted in favor of this
Charter amendment.8 ' The amendment would also authorize "an Executive
Director elected by more than a specified number of members to appoint two
Alternates."" The immediate (and intended) effect of this latter change would be
to increase the "voice" of the two Executive Directors' offices representing
African constituencies.
The same trajectory of change-designed to respond to the "democracy
deficit" criticism-is evident in another important area as well: selection of the
IMF Managing Director. In a 2008 report acknowledging that the gradual
reforms that have taken place in the governance of the IMF "have not kept pace
with changes in the environment in which it operates";" the lEO recommended
that "[t]he selection process for the Managing Director should be reformed ....
Candidates' qualifications and likely effectiveness should be the main criteria
used in the selection, and the competition should be open to candidates of all
nationalities."1 Similarly, a 2009 report of a Committee on IMF Governance
Reform-an external group of experts appointed by the IMF Managing
Director-called for "[t]he introduction of an open, transparent and merit-based
system for the appointment of the Managing Director and Deputy Managing
Directors."92
It is worth noting that the 2008 and 2009 reports and recommendations go
much further than recommending a change in the process for selection of the
Managing Director. Both reports also urge sweeping changes in other aspects of
IMF governance as well. These include (i) the activation of the Council of
Ministers (as provided for in the IMF Charter but not used yet) "as the ultimate
decision-making body for [the IMF,]" (ii) the reorientation of "the Executive
Board's activities away from executive day-to-day operational activities towards
a supervisory role[,]" and (iii) "the lowering of the voting threshold on critical
decisions from 85 percent to 70-75 percent, and consideration given to extending
the IMF Executive Board to the IMF Board of Governors. See IMF, Reform of Quota and Voice in the
International Monetary Fund-Report of the Executive Board to the Board of Governors 23 (Mar. 28, 2008),
available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/pp/eng/2008/032108.pdf [hereinafter Reform of Quota and Voice].
The modified Charter provision on basic votes is formulated in a way that will permit basic votes to be
increased as overall quote increases occur in the future, by prescribing that "[t]he basic votes of each member
shall be the number of votes that results from the equal distribution among all the members of 5.502 percent of
the aggregate sum of the total voting power of all the members, provided that there shall be no fractional basic
votes." Id.
87. See IMF, Consents to the Proposed Amendments of the Articles of Agreement (Feb. 25, 2010),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/misc/consents.htm [hereinafter IMF Consents to Agreement].
88. Reform of Quota and Voice, supra note 86, at 23.
89. See Quota Recommendation, supra note 84.
90. Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF, Governance of the IMF: An Evaluation 1 (2008),
available at http://www.ieo-imf.org/eval/complete/eval_05212008.html [hereinafter IEO Governance Report].
91. Id. at 22.
92. IMF, Committee on IMF Governance Reform, Final Report 4 (March 24, 2009), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/omd/2009/govref/032409.pdf [hereinafter Experts Governance Report].
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double majorities to a wider range of decisions" so as to ensure support of those
decisions by most members.3
The precise outcome of these initiatives, which have been strongly urged but
not yet set in stone, will reveal how serious the IMF-or more precisely, the
handful of most powerful IMF members-really is about responding to the
"democracy deficit" criticism and thereby gaining legitimacy to help the IMF
meet the challenges that have been given to it in the context of the GFC 08/09.
My own impression is that substantial changes are sure to be made. Whether they
prove adequate or not remains to be seen.
C. Involvement of Other International Institutions
Subsections A and B, above, highlight how the G-20 and the IMF have
responded to the GFC 08/09. Of these two entities, the IMF is the pivotal one in
addressing the many detailed efforts that the crisis indicates need to be made.
However, the IMF is part of a larger system of international financial institutions
that have been developed over the past several decades to deal with international
economic relations. Some of those other international financial institutions have
also taken new initiatives in response to the GFC 08/09. Several of these are
enumerated below.
Key initiatives taken by the World Bank Group (the IMF's sister Bretton
Woods institution) in response to the global financial crisis include the
following:'
* Providing loans for infrastructure projects both to enable countries to
implement economic stimulus plans and to promote long-term
economic growth;
* Providing loans to help to ensure that banks have adequate levels of
capital and liquidity, to enable them (1) to promote public confidence
in the banking sector, (2) to prevent unhealthy slowdowns in credit
growth, and (3) to help counter non-performing assets resulting from
the global financial crisis;
* Providing support for fiscal reforms to ensure long-run fiscal and
macroeconomic stability;
* Providing loans to increase investing in social safety nets; and
* Providing loans aimed to increase financing to small businesses and
microfinance institutions.
93. The first two of these recommendations appear in the IEO Governance Report, supra note 90, at vii.
All three appear in the Experts Governance Report, supra note 92, at 3-4.
94. The information in this paragraph and the next draws generally from various pages on the website of
the World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org, and in particular http://www.worldbank.org/financialcrisis/ (both
last visited October 2, 2009).
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In addition to these steps, the World Bank also approved US$2.6 billion in
loans in 2009 to support healthy financial and investment climates in middle-
income countries, and tripled investment in safety nets and social protection up to
US$12 billion over the next two years.
Key initiatives taken by the Asian Development Bank, one of the four main
regional development banks, include the following:"
* Establishing a three billion dollar Countercyclical Support Facility
("CSF") which will supply stimulus financing to its developing
member countries in the form of short-term, fast-disbursing loans;
* Approving additional liquidity of US$400 million for member
countries borrowing from the Asian Development Fund (("ADF"),
the low-cost lending window of the Asian Development Bank) and
adding the option to front-load the 2009-2010 biennial allocations for
ADF borrowers;
* Adjusting pre-crisis loans in light of current financial and economic
needs of borrowers.
Key initiatives taken by the European Central Bank in response to the GFC
08/09 include the following:96
* Following a new fixed rate full allotment tender procedure to ensure
sufficient liquidity;
* Accepting a wider range of securities, including a wider range of
private securities, as collateral in order to ease liquidity restraints and
encourage banks to roll over maturing loans and extend new credit;
and
* Offering refinancing to a large number of counterparties to ensure
public confidence that intermediaries will have sufficient liquidity.
In short, several other international financial institutions have undertaken
initiatives designed, like those of the IMF, to provide resources necessary for
95. The information in this paragraph draws generally from various pages on the website of the Asian
Development Bank, http://www.adb.org, and in particular http://www.adb.org/Economic-Crisis/default.asp
(both last visited October 2, 2009).
96. The information in this paragraph draws generally from various pages on the website of the
European Central Bank, especially: Press Release, European Central Bank, ECB and other Central Banks
decide to continue Conducting US Dollar Liquidity-Providing Operations (Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.ecb.int/
press/pr/date/2009/html/prO90924 2.en.html; Press Release, European Central Bank, ECB Activates the Swap
Line with Sveriges Riksbank (June 10, 2009), http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2009/html/pr)906l0.en.html;
Press Release, European Central Bank, Measures Designed to Address Elevated Pressures in the Short-Term US
Dollar Funding Markets (Sept. 26, 2008), www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2008/html/prO80926.en.html; Press
Release, European Central Bank, Swiss National Bank and European Central Bank Cooperation to provide
Swiss Franc Liquidity (Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2008/html/pr81015_1.en.html.
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governments to carry out economic stimulus programs and bring stability to the
financial institutions in their states.
IV. THE GFC IN LARGER HISTORICAL AND GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT
Having sketched out the general contours of (i) the causes and repercussions
of the GFC 08/09, and (ii) the international institutional response to the crisis,
with particular attention to the IMF, let us now widen our field of view to
consider how the GFC fits into a larger landscape of developments. In the
following paragraphs I offer a thumbnail sketch of several instances of financial
and monetary crisis in the 20th century. I suspect that with the exception of the
Asian financial crisis that erupted in 1997, most of these instances would be
disregarded as ancient history (if they are known about at all) by many observers.
Taken together, however, these crises impress me as forming a pattern into which
the GFC 08/09 fits quite naturally (unfortunately). I hope by examining that
pattern of crisis, we might gain a useful perspective on the challenge we face
today in considering what can be done (if anything) to avoid the distress of yet
another crisis.
A. The Early Twentieth Century
First, it is worth remembering that the Great Depression that started in the
United States and then spread to much of the rest of the world in the 1930s was,
in substantial part, a financial crisis.97 It started in the 1920s with fluctuating
commodities prices, but achieved its most visible form as a financial crisis with
the stock market crash of 1929. On October 29, 1929, also known as "Black
Friday," stocks lost roughly forty percent of their value. By 1933, these stocks
had lost eighty percent of their pre-Black-Friday value. Many people lost their
life savings. Banks were strained, especially those whose depositors, having lost
confidence in the market and banking systems, tried to withdraw all their money
at once. Banks were not able to meet this demand for cash, and they started
calling in loans. As prices and incomes plunged by as much as fifty percent, these
debts became harder and harder to pay. In the year after Black Friday, 744 U.S.
banks failed. A total of 11,000 of the 25,000 U.S. banks would fail by the end of
the Great Depression.
My father's father was the president of a small bank in a northeast Missouri
town at the time this financial crisis was unfolding. His was among many banks,
large and small, that closed their doors and never opened them again. For those
that did re-open, of course, a heavy load of regulation-from both state and
federal sources-was put in place; with that regulation came a promise of
97. The information in this paragraph and the next paragraph is drawn largely from Modem American
Poetry, About the Great Depression, http://www.english.illinois.edulmaps/depression/about.htm (last visited
Nov. 1, 2009).
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support, especially in the form of deposit insurance provided by the federal
authorities via the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Similar forms of
support, signaling an acknowledgment that the government has a special role to
play in the health and safety of financial institutions, were developed over later
years in the United States and were put in place in countries all around the world.
Those efforts helped create some safety and stabilization, but they did not
create economic growth adequate to pull the United States and the rest of the
world out of the Great Depression. By many accounts, it was World War II, and
particularly the dramatic increase in U.S. industrial and economic activity to arm
the Allied countries to fight the war, that overcame the Great Depression. Then,
as the war was winding down, economic and political leaders in the Allied
powers identified two dangerous national economic policy trends that they
thought would have to be reversed in order to prevent the world from descending
again into economic distress-and possibly into another war.
Those two national economic policy trends were forms of protectionism that
developed in the years between World War I and World War I.9' "First, the
major states engaged in competitive raising of tariff barriers, seeking economic
gains at the expense of their trading partners . . . ."99 These high tariffs tended to
stifle international trade. Second, some states also engaged in another national
economic policy: competitive devaluations of national currencies. "Official
measures by a national government to reduce the value of that [country's]
currency against the currencies of other countries typically have the effect of (i)
making imported items more expensive for the residents of the devaluing state,
and (ii) making items exported from that state more attractively priced for
residents of other states against whose currencies the exporting state's currency
has been devalued."'" In the 1930s, several states engaged in the practice of
currency devaluation to gain these short-term advantages in the terms of trade
with other countries. Such currency practices, and others, provided a drag on
trade among states.
By the 1940s, both of these economic policy trends that emerged in the inter-
war years-competitive raising of tariff barriers and competitive devaluations of
currencies-were regarded by many economic and political leaders as dangerous
to world economic stability and, therefore, to the peace that was to be sought
after World War II. They saw two necessities: (i) to encourage international trade
by reducing tariff levels and other trade barriers; and (ii) to encourage
international trade also by stabilizing and regulating national currency values.
It was the second of these two perceived necessities that led to the creation of
the IMF. The new organization would prescribe and enforce rules to stabilize
currency rates and encourage currency convertibility among states. Hence, at the
Bretton Woods conference in New Hampshire in the summer of 1944, the IMF
98. The following account is drawn from HEAD-2008, supra note 46, at 97-100.
99. Id. at 97.
100. Id.
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Charter was finalized; and in December 1945 the Charter came into effect,
thereby creating the "par value system" that lasted for twenty-five years. In order
to make this "par value" system work, the IMF Charter authorized the IMF to
make short-term loans available to member countries having temporary balance-
of-payments difficulties as could occur when a bad crop year reduced a country's
export revenues.
B. Currency, Debt, and Financial Crises of the 1970s and 1980s
1. Collapse of the Par Value System
Let us fast-forward now to the early 1970s. As participants in this
symposium know, the par value system of fixed exchange rates broke down in
the early 1970s, when the U.S. government announced it would no longer abide
by some of its IMF Charter obligations on currency convertibility. This collapse
followed a period of currency chaos, in which several countries manipulated their
currency values in circumvention of the par-value-system restrictions; these
measures, in turn, precipitated further currency chaos.'0o
In these chaotic circumstances, the par value system ultimately was
recognized as having been overwhelmed by new conditions and the IMF's
members radically amended the IMF Charter accordingly, in the form of the
Second Amendment.'02 As a result, the IMF's operations were correspondingly
reduced: instead of being responsible for both (i) managing the par value system
and (ii) conducting surveillance of the international monetary system, the IMF
now retained only the second of those major functions.
2. The 1982 Debt Crisis
However, when the 1982 debt crisis broke out upon announcements by
Mexico and Brazil that they would no longer be able to service their commercial
debt obligations, the IMF took a lead role that set the stage for its operations ever
since. The 1982 debt crisis posed an enormous risk to the international financial
101. For a summary description of the collapse of the par value system, see generally Eric Dorkin,
Development, the IMF, & Institutional Investors: The Mexican Financial Crisis, UNIV. OF IOWA CENTER FOR
INT'L FIN. & DEV., available at http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/ebook2/contents/part3-III.shtml. For a more
extensive treatment, see generally STEVEN M. SURANOVIC, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE THEORY AND POLICY:
THE BREAKUP OF BRETTON-WOODS Chapter 100, available at http://intemationalecon.com/Finance/Fchl
00/F 100- .php.
102. Perhaps the most important change appeared in Article IV of the Charter. In its original
formulation, Article IV provided for the establishment of a par value (expressed in terms of gold or US dollars)
for each member country's currency and prohibited a country from changing or departing from such par value
by more than 1% (in most cases) without IMF approval. After the amendments of the late 1970s, Article IV
permitted each member country to establish exchange arrangements of its choice and merely required a member
country to notify the IMF of its decision in that regard.
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system, so it is worth examining as we paint this broad "landscape" of financial
crises of the twentieth century.
The starting point for the debt crisis of 1982 was the global oil crisis of
1973.103 Oil prices, which were as low as US$1.30 per barrel in 1970, more than
doubled to US$2.70 per barrel in 1973.This was partly a result of the newly
formed cartel operated by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
("OPEC"). By 1974, oil prices had reached a whopping US$10.00 per barrel. A
second global oil crisis began in 1979. In 1978, Saudi crude oil cost US$13.00
per barrel. By 1981, Saudi crude had risen to US$32.50 per barrel. Naturally,
countries that relied on imported oil had to spend much more money to meet their
oil needs. Developing countries resorted to foreign borrowing to pay the
increased oil costs. Because much of the surplus money from oil exporting
countries was saved in western banks, these banks had plenty of money to lend to
developing countries. As a result, the current accounts deficit of developing
countries rose from US$11 billion in 1973 to US$46 billion in 1975.
The rising price of oil alone did not lead to the debt crisis of 1982; falling
commodity prices also contributed. Many developing countries exported
commodities. However, as the industrial countries slowed production, the
demand for commodities lessened. The year 1975 saw a nineteen percent drop in
demand for commodities. Developing countries paid more for oil and received
less for the commodities they exported. At the same time, the U.S. dollar was
appreciating. This meant that loan repayments, which were to be made in dollars,
cost more in terms of local currency.
Increased interest rates contributed to the debt crisis as well. Lenders made
their loans subject to variable interest rates, pegging those rates above inflation to
ensure that they were adequately compensated. As interest rates in the United
States surged in the 1970s, so did interest rates on loans that had been made to
the developing countries. Because of the rising prices of oil and the falling prices
of commodities, many developing countries had to take out new loans to service
their old loans.'0 In some cases, the new loans covered only the interest of the old
105loans.
All of these factors-the rise in oil prices, the collapse of commodity prices,
the appreciation of the U.S. dollar, and the increase in interest rates on loans-
contributed to Mexico's declaration in 1982 that it could no longer service its
debt.'6 In August 1982, Mexican officials flew to Washington D.C. to inform the
103. Except as otherwise indicated, all information in this account of the 1982 debt crisis is drawn from
P. Kalonga Stambuli, Causes and Consequences of the 1982 Third World Debt Crisis, (Oct. 1998) (Pre-
Doctoral Research Paper, University of Surrey), available at http://129.3.20.41/eps/if/papers/0211/0211005.pdf.
104. Id. at 2.
105. Id. at 12.
106. See John W. Head, Suspension of Debtor Countries' Voting Rights in the IMF: An Assessment of
the Third Amendment to the IMF Charter, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 591, 597 n.19 (1993) [hereinafter Head-1993]. For
a detailed account of the 1982 debt crisis, see Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [FDIC], The LDC Debt
Crisis, in AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990s 191 (1997), available at
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U.S Treasury Secretary that Mexico was defaulting on its international financial
obligations.' 7 After Mexico's default, most banks stopped lending to developing
countries. Because these countries had been relying on new debt to service old
debt, they began defaulting on their loans. As these countries attempted to pay
back their debt, the capital outflow depreciated exchange rates and thereby raised
the real interest rate. In per capita terms, real GDP growth for Latin America was
a negative nine percent between 1980 and 1985.
These economic repercussions that occurred at the national level as a result
of the 1982 debt crisis had dramatic results at the international level, especially
for the IMF. As I have described elsewhere, the severe strain that the crisis
placed on the international financial system prompted U.S. government officials
and other world leaders to turn to the IMF to help manage the crisis, ultimately
leading to an enormous increase in the volume of IMF lending.08
3. The United States Savings and Loan Crisis
The debt crisis that began in 1982, and that had international implications for
several years thereafter, was paralleled in the U.S. financial system by another
crisis that stretched through much of the 1980s-the "savings and loan crisis."
That crisis followed a familiar pattern that involved lax regulation, "bubble"
enthusiasm, and collapse.
The crisis could be summarized as follows: In an effort to salvage the
floundering savings and loan ("S&L") industry in the early 1980s, the U.S.
government deregulated the industry and expanded the lending capabilities of the
S&Ls. Also known as "thrifts," the S&Ls are specialized banking institutions that
use savings deposit accounts to fund mortgages and other loans. Deregulation of
the S&L industry coupled with federal insurance of savings deposits-especially
in conjunction with a period of volatile, high interest rates and a real estate
bubble-fostered unsustainable, high-risk lending that eventually drove many
S&Ls to insolvency. Mass insolvency of S&Ls, in turn, drove the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC"), which insured S&L savings
deposits, into insolvency. The S&L crisis culminated at the end of the decade
with a federal bailout of FSLIC and the passage of the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), which
restructured regulation in the S&L industry and established the Resolution Trust
Corporation for the purpose of closing failed S&Ls. The effects of the crisis were
felt well into the next decade.
www.fdic.gov/bank/historicallhistory/1912 10.pdf.
107. Guillermo Emiliano del Toro, Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico and the 1994 Crisis: A Legal
Perspective, 20 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 1, 15 (1997).
108. See generally Head-1993, supra note 106.
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Some elements of that brief narrative warrant expansion, in part because they
resemble elements in the GFC 08/09. Here is a slightly more detailed
chronological account of the S&L crisis:
* Between 1966 and 1979, interest rates were volatile. In 1979, oil
prices doubled, and the Federal Reserve Board restricted the money
supply. Inflation and short-term interest rates rose drastically.'"
* Because of ceilings placed on interest rates that S&Ls could offer on
savings held with them, the rise of interest rates available in other
investments created liquidity problems for S&Ls; and in response,
the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of
1978 was enacted to allow S&Ls to invest certain amounts of their
assets in land development, construction, and education loans."o
* From 1981 to 1982, the S&L industry reported losses of nearly US$9
billion."'
* In 1980 and 1982, in an effort to boost the S&L industry into
profitability, the U.S. Congress deregulated the industry and further
expanded the lending authority of S&Ls. Specifically, new laws
removed the interest rate ceiling on deposit accounts as well as the
limit on the amount of brokered deposits that an S&L could hold.
Congress also raised the deposit insurance limit from US$40,000 to
US$100,000 and reduced the net worth requirements for insured
S&Ls. 112
* In September of 1981, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB) issued "income capital certificates" which were purchased
by the FSLIC and effectively allowed insolvent S&Ls to masquerade
as solvent."'
* The Tax Reform Act of 1981 provided tax incentives for real estate
investors, contributing to a real estate bubble and over-building.114
109. See Bert Ely, Savings and Loan Crisis, LIBR. OF EcON. & LIBERTY (2008), available at http://www.
econlib.org/library/Enc/SavingsandLoanCrisis.html; FDIC, The S&L Crisis: A Chrono-Bibliography (2002),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historicals&ll [hereinafter Chrono-Bibliography].
110. See Chrono-Bibliography, supra note 109.
111. See Ely, supra note 109.
112. See Chrono-Bibliography, supra note 109. See also Michelle Minton, Community Reinvestment
Act's Harmful Legacy: How It Hampers Access to Credit, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST.: ONPOINT, Mar. 20,
2008, at 2, available at http http://cei.org/on-point/2008/03/20/community-reinvestment-act%E2%80%99s-
harmful-legacy.
113. See Chrono-Bibliography, supra note 109.
114. Id.
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* In response to the real estate boom and relaxation of FHLBB
supervision, S&Ls increased lending, with industry assets jumping
fifty-six percent between 1982 and 1985.115
* Deregulation led to increased competition, driving up interest rates
paid by S&Ls to depositors and encouraging risky lending.' 6
* The Tax Reform Act of 1986 removed many real estate tax shelters,
causing real estate values to fall."'
* In the decade following 1986, 1,043 S&L institutions failed, and the
total number of S&L institutions dropped by about half."'
* By 1987, FSLIC had become insolvent, and by 1989, Congress
stepped in and bailed out the S&Ls."9
* The FIRREA, enacted in 1989, restructured federal regulation of the
S&L industry. 12 Specifically:
* The Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") was created for the
purpose of disposing of insolvent S&Ls;
* The Office of Thrift Supervision replaced the FHLBB as the agency
empowered to regulate S&Ls; and
* The Savings Association Insurance Fund ("SAIF") replaced the
FSLIC as the agency empowered to provide ongoing insurance to
S&Ls.
C. The Troubled 1990s
The financial crises of the 1980s that I have recounted briefly above-the
international debt crisis that erupted in 1982 and the US S&L crisis-were
echoed in the next decade. Indeed, Professor Douglas Amer of Hong Kong
University has observed that "[i]n many ways, financial crises were a defining
feature of the last decade of the twentieth century." 2' The following paragraphs
summarize three such crises, all striking first at the national level and then
gaining such momentum as to present the risk of contagion. These crises,
115. Id.
116. Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of Savings & Loan Crisis: Truth & Consequences, FDIC
BANKING REV., Dec. 2000, at 27, available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2000dec/
brvi3n2-2.pdf.
117. See J. Steven Beabout, The Effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on Real Estate Transactions, 16
COLO. LAW. 207, 207 (1987).
118. Curry & Shibut, supra note 116, at 27.
119. See Chrono-Bibliography, supra note 109.
120. Id.; Michael P. Malloy, Financial Services Regulation: a Mid-Decade Review: Colloquium:
Double Toil and Trouble: Bank Regulatory Policy at Mid-Decade, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2031, 2035 (1995).
121. DOUGLAS W. ARNER, FINANCIAL STABILITY, EcONOMIC GROWTH, AND THE ROLE OF LAW 64
(2007).
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afflicting Mexico, a trio of Asian countries, and Russia, each prompted
substantial IMF involvement.
1. The Mexican Peso Crisis
The peso crisis of 1994 cannot be adequately understood without reference to
the 1982 debt crisis summarized above. The origins of Mexico's 1982 default can
be traced back to the oil price boom of the latter half of the 1970s, as the
Mexican government built its economic growth plan around oil-price forecasts
that later proved to be overly optimistic.1 22 The large fiscal deficit, reaching
14.1% of the GDP in 1981, was financed through international borrowings.123 But
with oil revenues falling far short of expectations, and with no other substantial
sources of revenue, Mexico began witnessing a tide of capital outflow.12 4 The
peso came under attack, and the government used short-term external borrowings
to try to keep its fixed exchange rate; this proved unsustainable.12 With debt
service in 1982 consuming sixty-two percent of exports revenues, and foreign
debt measuring over US$92 billion,126 Mexico was unable to meet its debt
obligations.
In the aftermath of the 1982 crisis, Mexico's banking sector was
nationalizedl 27 and the peso was devalued. Mexico started a recovery plan,
supported by a financing arrangement under the IMF's Extended Fund Facility,
with the aims of lowering inflation, cutting government spending, and restoring
the country's trade balance. 12 In August 1983, about a year after the crisis first
erupted, Mexico signed an agreement with its creditors to restructure its
outstanding debt.129
Mexico's banking system remained under government control between 1982
and 1987, and during this time Mexico's economy was stagnant and inflation was
high.3 o However, another financial crisis hit the country in 1988 (a presidential
election year); when Mexico's stock markets crashed, the peso was devalued, and
foreign capital fled again."' The answer this time was a market oriented plan
along with a privatization scheme and re-privatization of banks.
122. NORA LUSTIG, MEXICO, THE REMAKING OF AN ECONOMY 20 (2d ed. 1998).
123. Id. at 21.
124. Id. at 24.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 31.
127. Leonardo Torre, Banking Crisis in Mexico, in GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISES AND REFORMS CASES &
CAVEATS 213 (B.N. Ghosh. ed., 2001).
128. LUSTIG, supra note 122, at 29. The IMF later stopped the disbursements under the EEF as Mexico
failed to achieve some of the targets.
129. Toro, supra note 107, at 69.
130. See Francisco Gil-Diaz, The Origin of Mexico's 1994 Financial Crisis, 17 CATO J. 303, 306 n.6
(1998), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj i7n3/cj 17n3-7a.pdf.
131. William A. Orme Jr., Mexican President Tackles Stagflation With Tough Austerity Plan, WASH.
POST, Dec. 20, 1987, at K04., available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatliongterm/mexico/
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This see-saw action of nationalization and then re-privatization of Mexico's
financial institutions was to play a part in the peso crisis of 1994, as was another
development in the years leading up to that year. The elections of 1987 brought
to power President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, a free market supporter widely
credited with bringing reform and recovery to Mexico. The North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") was signed in 1992 and came into effect in 1994.
Mexico's macroeconomic indicators were positive: inflation dropped from 160%
in 1987 to 8% in 1993.'" Mexico allowed foreign banks to open branches in the
country and new banks were established.'3 Mexico's reforms were successful in
attracting foreign investment and movement of capital inflows replenished the
Mexican economy.
However, the years of having a nationalized banking industry took their toll
on the Mexican banking sector; the lack of trained bankers who were able to
assess risks in a profit-oriented system led to poor risk assessment, which in turn
developed into serious problems with non-performing loans.16 Moreover, the
process by which the banks were privatized was not without mistakes: some bank
buy-outs were financed through loans from the very same bank; some banks
were, and remained, undercapitalized; and the already weak financial supervisory
authorities were overwhelmed by the influx of re-privatized and new banks. 3 1
The availability of credit from domestic and foreign sources encouraged
consumer and government spending, thus increasing the current account deficit,
which was financed through short-term borrowing. 3 1
The increase in credit availability did not reflect growth; GDP grew only by
2.9% between 1990 and 1994.13 Apparently, the slow growth did not, until
December 1994, affect the peso exchange rate. It remained within the highest end
of the government-established exchange-rate band 40 and was not allowed to fall
below 3.46 pesos to the dollar.4'
stories/871220.htm.
132. Torre, supra note 129, at 213.
133. Gil-Diaz, supra note 130; Rudiger Dornbusch, Alejandro Werner, Guillermo Calvo, Stanley
Fischer, Mexico: Stabilization, Reform, and No Growth, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 1994, at
253, 254-315.
134. Torre, supra note 127, at 214.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 219.
137. Gil-Diaz, supra note 130, at 305.
138. Id.
139. Toro, supra note at 107.
140. Following the 1982 crisis the peso had been allowed to move within a relatively narrow range, or
band, of pre-determined highs and lows. Prior to December 1994, the peso was closest to the higher end of the
band. See Gil-Diaz, supra note 130.
141. Anthony DePalma, Crisis in Mexico: The Overview; With Peso Freed, Mexican Currency Drops
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Thus the economic conditions were in place-viewed in retrospect, at least-
for the Mexican peso crisis of 1994. It was only a matter of time before the peso
would be recognized as an overvalued currency not supported by real growth.
That recognition was hurried by a series of events in Mexico's political arena.
The year 1994 brought a rebellious uprising in the Chiapas region, the
assassination of the dominant party's presidential candidate, the resignation (later
withdrawn) of the Minister of Interior, the kidnapping of a prominent Mexican
businessman, the assassination of the highest-ranking official in the ruling party,
and more.'42
Raising the specter of growing political instability and uncertainty, these
developments naturally drew the attention of prospective foreign investors. Once
those prospective foreign investors realized that the peso was overvalued, capital
inflows started to slow down for fears of devaluation.143 At the same time,
existing investors started to exit,'" selling their peso-denominated debts, thus
putting demand on Mexico's foreign currency reserves.
The Mexican government used its foreign reserves to defend the peso but
those reserves were becoming dangerously low.145 Accordingly, Mexico
announced on December 20, 1994, that it was allowing the peso to move more
freely against the U.S. dollar-though still within a band, now featuring a floor
of four pesos to the dollar instead of the previous 3.46 to the dollar.' Three days
after that, the government took action to free-float the peso,147 and it dropped in
value to 4.80 to the dollar. The effects of these events were catastrophic; private
businesses and individuals who had foreign debts faced a sudden increase in the
value of their debts and imports became dramatically more expensive.
2. The Asian Financial Crisis
In a companion article to this one, I have examined the Asian financial crisis
in some detail.148 In doing so, I have reviewed developments that I first wrote
about roughly twelve years ago, at the very beginning of 1998, in the "heat of the
moment" when the long-term implications of the crisis were of course
completely unknown. Here is how I described the crisis at that time:
142. Torre, supra note 127, at 235; see also Tod Robberson, Top Mexican Presidential Candidate Is
Slain, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1994, at A01; see also Joseph A. Whitt, The Mexican Peso Crisis, FED. RES.
BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV., Jan.- Feb, 1996, at 2-3 (1996).
143. Toro, supra note 107, at 77.
144. Id. at 78.
145. Sebastian Edwards & Miguel A. Savastano, The Morning After: The Mexican Peso in the Aftermath
of the 1994 Currency Crisis 13 (NPER WORKING PAPER No. 6516, 1888), available at http:/www.
nber.org/papers/w6516.
146. DePalrna, supra note 141.
147. Id.
148. See generally Head-2010, supra note 3.
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The second half of 1997 proved disastrous for Asia-particularly
Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea. The 1997 financial crisis that hit those
countries was massive in scale. Here are some representative figures
showing the magnitude of the damage:
o The Thai baht, having traded at around 25 to the dollar for
thirteen years, lost over half of its value between July 1997 and
January 1998, when it was trading at about 55 to the dollar.
Thailand's stock market value declined over 60% in that same
period.
o The Indonesian rupiah lost about 75% of its value against the
dollar between mid-1997 and early 1998. The Indonesian stock
market dropped in value even more than Thailand's had-by
over 75% in the second half of 1997.
o Korea was in some ways the hardest hit of all-and this is
especially significant because of its economic importance in
Asia. The won fell in value 70% between mid-October and mid-
December 1997, and Korea's stock market lost two-thirds of its
value from August to December. Korea's foreign exchange
reserves fell by more than 50% in the space of two months.
Bonds issue[d] by one of Korea's biggest banks were trading at
60% of face value in December 1997, down from 100% of face
value in October 1997.149
A year later, in early 1999, I wrote another article on the Asian Financial
Crisis and explained some of the damage it had done as of that point:
It has been a crisis for millions of people in Asia in terms of their household
economies, businesses, savings, education, health, and futures. President Clinton,
in his state of the union address in January [1999], called it "the most serious
financial crisis in a half a century." A leading economist has referred to it as
"something that has no parallel in human history." For millions of people, it has
increased unemployment, prices, and poverty, while cutting opportunities for
education, health, and other social programs.so
In a nutshell, the economic trauma that hit Asia a dozen years ago caused
widespread distress, particularly in Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea. It left both
the populations and the governments of those countries severely wounded.
149. John W. Head, Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis: The Role of the IMF and the United
States, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 70, 70 (1998) [hereinafter Head-1998J (citations omitted).
150. John W. Head, Global Implications of the Asian Financial Crisis: Banking, Economic Integration,
and Crisis Management in the New Century, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 939, 940 (1999) [hereinafter Head-
1999] (citations omitted).
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3. The Russian Debt-and-Currency Crisis5'
The Russian experience of the late 1990s provides confirmation that the risk
of contagion is real: the Asian financial crisis, summarized above, provided a
push that helped send the Russian economy over the edge in late 1997. However,
the history of what became the Russian crisis begins much earlier than 1997.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Russia began a
transition from a planned economy to a market-based economy. As early as
August 1992, Russia was a recipient of an IMF stand-by arrangement amounting
to SDR 719 million.5 2 In 1994 the IMF provided transitioning Russia with
assistance under its brand-new Systemic Transformation Facility. Russian efforts
remained unsuccessful, however, to drive inflation down and increase Russia's
foreign currency reserves, so Russia returned to the IMF, which in April 1995
approve another standby arrangement to help put the Russian efforts back on
track."' By the end of 1995 inflation was down to single-digit levels, 5 4 and
Russia started an economic reform and stabilization program under a three-year
IMF Extended Fund Facility arrangement."' The 1996 program aimed at
achieving certain macroeconomic goals by the end of 1998: lowering ongoing
inflation to a single-digit annual rate, increasing Russia's foreign currency
reserves, restoring the budget deficit to moderate levels (0.4%), enhancing
government tax collection, and achieving GDP growth.'56 The structural reform
portion of the 1996 program included trade liberalization and privatization.'
The actual crisis in the Russian economy constituted a blend of a short-term
debt crisis and a currency crisis. The debt crisis had its roots in the fact that one
of the main tools used by the Russian government for driving down inflation"
151. In addition to other sources cited in the following paragraphs regarding the Russian crisis of the late
1990s, see generally Abbigail J. Chiodo & Michael T. Owyang, A Case Study of the Currency Crisis: The
Russian Default of 1998, 84 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis REV. 7 (2002), available at http://research.
stlouisfed.org/publications/review/02/1 1/ChiodoOwyang.pdf.
152. Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], Chronology: IMF Evolves in Response to Over Half a Century of
Challenge and Change, http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/sup0998/14.htm (Sept. 1998).
153. Press Release, IMF, IMF Approves Stand-by Credit for Russia, No. 95/21 (Apr. 11, 1995),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1995/pr9521.htm. This loan was in an amount of SDR 4.3
billion (about US$6.8 billion).
154. Press Release, IMF, IMF Approves Three-Year EFF Credit for the Russian Federation, No. 96/13,




158. Most accounts point to a weak tax base, tax collection delinquencies, a barter system between the
Government and businesses and hence falling government revenue. One commentator described the Russian
government's policy to issue GKO's as a "measure covering up the failure of transition to market, the de-
industrialization of the country. The GKO pyramid scheme set Russia on a course of disaster by relying more
and more on foreign borrowing, which was not invested into infrastructure, not invested in production, but in
covering up the growing deficits to make Russia look like it was moving to a market economy." Vladimir
Brovkin, Wishful Thinking about Russia?, BEYOND TRANSITION NEWSLETTER, May/June 1999, at 22-25,
available at http://www.worldbank.orgthtml/prddr/trans/mayjun99/pgs22-25.htm.
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was the issuance of debt instruments for use in borrowing (instead of printing
money, thus running the risk of spurring inflation). The use of GKOs (the
Russian abbreviation for Treasury bills or short term Government bonds') and,
to a lesser extent, the OFZ (medium to long term bonds'61) were open to domestic
investors initially, and in 1997 "non-resident" investors were allowed into the
GKO/OFZ market as well."' The sheer size of government borrowing through
GKO and OFZ was not insignificant, reaching twenty percent of the Russian
GDP in 1996, as well as in 1997.162 Moreover, the total estimated value of
GKO/OFZ redeemable only in 1998 was 1.5 times higher than that year's total
revenues of the Russian Federal budget.6 1
One cause of the Russian currency crisis is to be found in contagion from the
Asian financial crisis. It may be that the crisis of confidence among investors
(especially foreign investors) that precipitated the crisis in Thailand, Indonesia,
and Korea moved to Russia.'6' Another precipitating factor could be the
deterioration of oil prices' 5 (due to lower demand for crude oil'), which
negatively affected Russian reserves of foreign exchange.
Since Russia had a fixed exchange rate (although the ruble was allowed to
move within a band), speculative attacks-that is, speculative selling by currency
traders-took place on the ruble, just as attacks had taken place against national
currencies in the context of the Asian financial crisis. Russia exhausted billions
of dollars to sustain the ruble at its pre-crisis levels.16 Finally, on August 17,
1998, Russia devalued the ruble and announced its inability to pay its ruble-
denominated debt.'6 It also restructured all of its obligations due until the end of
1999 and imposed a ninety-day moratorium on private foreign principal
payments.16
159. Kaj Hob6r, Investment Arbitration In Eastern Europe: Recent Cases on Expropriation, 14 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 377, 396 (2003).
160. Id.
161. Brian Pinto, Evsey Gurvich, & Sergei Ulatov, Lessons from the Russian Crisis of 1998 and
Recovery, in MANAGING VOLATILITY & CRISES: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 4 (Joshua Aizenman & Brian Pinto
eds., 2004), available at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/mv/mvcguide.htmil.
162. Evsey Gurvich, Looking Back at Russian Financial Crisis 4 (GET PROJECTS, FORD FOUNDATION,
Working Paper No. 2001/030, 2001), available at http://www.nes.rulenglish/research/pdf/2001/Gurvich.pdf.
163. Id.
164. Pinto, Gurvich, & Ulatov, supra note 161, at 4.
165. JOSEPH E. STIGLrrz, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 199 (2d ed. 2003).
166. See Wikipedia, 1998 Russian Financial Crisis, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikill998_Russian-
financial-crisis (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
167. STIGLITZ, supra note 165, at 198.
168. Pinto, Gurvich & Ulatov, supra note 161, at 4.
169. Id.
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The brief chronological survey offered in this section shows a pattern of
crisis that I find deeply troubling. I have identified eight major instances of
financial chaos and distress that had significant international implications: (1) the
financial-crisis aspects of the Great Depression; (2) the inter-war experience with
competitive devaluations; (3) the collapse of the par value system; (4) the 1982
debt crisis; (5) the U.S. S&L crisis; (6) Mexico's peso crisis; (7) the Asian
financial crisis, and (8) the Russian debt-and-currency crisis. Others could also
have been included in this short survey,o but this litany of financial chaos is
surely adequate to illustrate the depressing regularity and frequency with which
such crises have occurred.17 ' This in turn serves to underscore the importance of
addressing these related questions: (i) What keeps going wrong; and (ii) What, if
anything, can be done to break this pattern?
V. THE LONGER VIEW: FAILURES, "FIxES," AND FUNDAMENTALS
In the preceding pages I have tried to provide: (1) a thumbnail account of
how the GFC 08/09 unfolded; (2) a survey of the international institutional
response to the GFC 08/09 (with special emphasis on the IMF); and (3) a
reminder of the broader historical landscape of global economic crises, of which
I see the GFC 08/09 as merely the most recently added geographical feature.
Now I wish to draw on those various points to offer some evaluative
observations.
In particular, I wish to address these questions: (i) What specific defects or
failures (if any) does the outbreak and spread of the GFC 08/09 reveal in the
system of global finance; (ii) What lessons can we learn (if any) about the "fixes"
that might be applied in order to reduce the likelihood of such crises occurring
again, or to mitigate their severity if they do occur; and (iii) What more
fundamental issues do we need to address-including, for example, fundamental
ideological values and human realities that might stand in the way of any
significant reform? I shall offer some answers to those questions based on my
own opinion and informed speculation (influenced, of course, by others), but
some of my answers will amount to little more than further questions. This
reflects a theme that emerges from my study of the GFC 08/09: there is a great
deal that we simply do not know, and possibly cannot know, about global
economic affairs.
170. One crisis that culminated in the early 2000s occurred in Argentina. For useful accounts of that
crisis, see Brad Sester & Anna Gelpern, Argentina's Pathway Through Financial Crisis (Global Economic
Governance Programme, GEG Working Paper 2004/02, 2005), available at http://www.globaleconomic
governance.org/wp-content/uploads/Setser%20and%20Gelpern%20-%20Argentina.pdf; J. F. HORNBECK,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, REPORT NO. RS21130, THE ARGENTINE FINANCIAL CRISIS: A
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS (2002), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/8040.pdf.
171. A recent IMF report is said to have counted the cost of "88 banking crises over the past four
decades." See The Long Climb, supra note 2, at 4. For a chart identifying several crises that have occurred in the
past century-including most of the ones summarized above-see ARNER, supra note 121, at 66.
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A. Failures
1. The Scope and Coordination of National Financial Regulation
In my view, we need not look far in our search for defects or failures that the
GFC 08/09 reveals in the system of global finance. Surely one failure lies in the
performance of national regulatory authorities and processes: in the United States
and elsewhere, regulatory regimes failed to protect the financial systems against
imprudence that created excessive systemic risk.'72 In one of a series of papers
issued by the IMF in early 2009 assessing certain "lessons of the Global Crisis,"
the IMF's Monetary and Capital Markets Department identified as "priorities for
action" these regulatory processes and approaches (among several others) that
had not been given adequate attention: 173
* "The perimeter of financial sector surveillance needs to be expanded
to a wider range of institutions and markets[,]"1 74 so as to avoid
having some entities (such as securities and insurance companies)
and some activities (such as off-balance-sheet activities) avoid
regulation or enjoy under-regulation;
* "Prudential regimes should encourage incentives that support
systemic stability; discourage regulatory arbitrage; and adopt a broad
concept of 'systemic' risk."7 1
* Capital adequacy requirements, provisioning requirements, and
liquidity requirements "should be more demanding in good times to
build buffers that in bad times can help to offset procyclical
pressures."'76
* More and better information regarding financial institutions,
especially those that are lightly regulated or that have off-balance-
sheet transactions, should be required;'77
* Financial supervision by national regulators should be supplemented
by (i) better capacity of central banks to provide liquidity in times of
172. For a discussion of this failure, see Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], IMF Survey Magazine: IMF
Research, New Methods Aim to Identify Systemic Financial Risks, (Apr, 21, 2009), available at http://www.
imf/org/extemal/pubs/ft/survey/so/2009/RES042109A.htm (reflecting the findings of an IMF report finding that
the "global crisis has highlighted that further progress is needed to identify and address systemic risks-those
that threaten the financial system rather than individual financial institutions or markets").
173. See generally IMF Regulation Lessons, supra note 18.
174. Id. at 4. For details regarding the "perimeter of financial regulation", see id. at 8-11.
175. Id. at 4.
176. Id. at 5. For details on the need for more effective capital adequacy requirements, see id. at 12.
177. Id. at 5.
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crisis and (ii) the removal of impediments to effective regulation of
cross-border institutions.1 7 8
The third of these points, capital adequacy, has received intense attention
recently from many quarters. These include, in addition to the IMF, the U.K.
Chancellor of the Exchequer, the European Council, and the Basel Committee.,
Another way to view the shortcoming I am discussing here-that is, a failure
in the performance of national regulatory authorities and processes-is in terms
of "sequencing." As Professor Arner has explained, in considering "how
countries should go about achieving the benefits of [financial] liberalization ...
while at the same time reducing risks of financial crisis, . . . the focus . . . is
increasingly on the concept of sequencing[,] . .. which looks to the process of
[financial] liberalization and the process of [financial] institutional
strengthening" through appropriate regulation.so We might therefore characterize
the failure of domestic financial regulation as being too-fast liberalization of
national financial sectors combined with too-slow strengthening of national
financial regulatory norms and institutions.
2. Failure of the Theory of "Self-Regulation"
A second failure, also located mainly at the national level, appears in the
theory of so-called "self-regulation." Just as the official public-sector regulatory
regimes-manned and managed by national government officials-failed to
prevent the chaos by ensuring that risky behavior would be held in check by
effective regulation, the private-sector financial institutions and their managers
also failed to prevent the chaos through what some thought was the magical
steadying hand of self-regulation. As Professor David Westbrook explains in his
insightful and provocative book, Out of Crisis, it simply is not true, at least in the
context of a chaotic bubble market, that financial institutions need no official
regulation because the competition found in the marketplace imposes its own
prudence-inspiring discipline. Instead, as he expresses it, "competition cannot be
presumed; and therefore market discipline cannot be presumed; and therefore
self-regulation cannot be presumed; and therefore government regulation may be
prudent."'
Because the theory of financial "self-regulation" held such long-standing
power over sophisticated economies, especially that of the United States, it is
178. Id.
179. See The Devil's Punchbowl, ECONOMIST, July 11, 2009, at 55. For other articles emphasizing the
need to concentrate on, and toughen, capital adequacy requirements, see Target Practice, ECONOMIST, July 11,
2009, at 73; Appetite Suppressant, ECONOMIST, July 11, 2009, at 16.
180. ARNER, supra note 121, at 268.
181. WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 10. For Westbrook's specific reference to "a rather chaotic bubble
market" as being the setting in which the logic of "self-regulation" breaks down, see id. at 11.
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worth a brief examination. Westbrook offers this explanation of the theory as
practiced in the United States:
As a policy matter, for some decades it was argued that no more
substantial regulation of financial market actors (or their instruments or
activities) was required, because such entities regulated themselves.
(Really.) So accounting firms, credit rating agencies, derivatives, hedge
funds, private equity funds,... [and other institutions and markets] all
escaped substantial regulation. . . . By the same logic, even as financial
industries evolved and new products were developed, expressing new
opportunities with new risks, (for examples, collateralized loan
obligations [CLOs], collateralized debt obligations [CDOs], credit
default swaps [DCSs], and an inexhaustible array of over-the-counter
arrangements) additional regulation for traditional highly regulated
entities, such as banks, brokerage houses, and exchanges, was deemed an
unnecessary drag on innovation. In 2004, the [US Securities and
Exchange Commission] relaxed the capital requirements on the biggest
investment banks, largely responsible for the creation and marketing of
these new products, and the banks promptly began doing business with
leverage ratios of thirty to one. As late as the fall of 2008, after admitting
that the risk management edifice had collapsed, Alan Greenspan told
Congress that additional regulation was hardly required, because this
time Wall Street had learned its lesson about prudent investment, and
would go forth and sin no more.18 2
The theory that markets involving corporate entities (such as banks) will
engage in "self-regulation," Westbrook explains, "is based on a tacit imagination
of the corporation as a risk-averse and rational individual, reliably disciplined by
its competitors."' The silliness of the notion of "self-regulation," Westbrook
argues, derives from the fact that every element of that tacit imagination is, in
fact, false (or at least doubtful) in the circumstances that developed in
sophisticated financial markets over recent years: (1) there was very little risk
aversion (because a key purpose of a limited-liability company is in fact to take
on risk); (2) a huge corporate entity cannot reasonably be regarded as having any
real understanding of its own position, so that it makes little sense to speak of a
corporation as acting rationally; and (3) for some imaginative financial products
and actors, effective competition did not exist.'"
182. Id. at 8.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 8-9.
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3. Collapse of the "Transparency" and the "Risk-management" Theories
A third failure, still located mainly at the national level, lies in the ultimate
bankruptcy of two theories, both of which were created and expected to avoid
financial crisis, but which ultimately failed to do so. The two theories are (i) the
"transparency" theory and (ii) the "risk-management" theory. As Professor
Westbrook also explains, the forty year period from about 1933 to 1974 was
characterized by a reliance on transparency to guard against financial chaos on
the theory that supplying players in the marketplace with adequate information
would guard against chaos and crisis.' That reliance was replaced around 1974'16
by a reliance on the "risk-management" approach, which accepts marketplace
danger and copes with it by diversified and hedged portfolios." 7 Westbrook
offers this historical synopsis, culminating in the collapse of both theories:
It makes some sense ... to understand these modes sequentially, as the
different approaches taken by, and defining, two different eras of
finance. It could be said that the era of transparency in the United States
ran from the Securities Act of 1933, which required companies offering
securities to the public to disclose vast quantities of information, to the
passage of ERISA in 1974, which had the unintended consequence of
transforming retirement so that most middle-class Americans were
turned into part-time portfolio managers. In the same spirit, we might say
that the era of risk management runs from 1974 until the passage of the
$700 billion congressional bailout in the fall of 2008. We are, then,
living after the death of the second era of finance.'
My own observation based on Westbrook's statement is this: to put it bluntly,
we are not smart enough-any of us, whether we are ordinary investors or
financial sophisticates-for transparency alone to help us guard ourselves,
individually or collectively, against financial disaster given the complexity of the
financial instruments and transactions that clever thinkers and integrated markets
have produced in recent years. Hence, to use Westbrook's metaphor, putting all
our eggs into one basket and then watching the basket very closely (with the aid
of voluminous information)'" will not suffice. Nor will the "risk-management"
185. Id. at 49.
186. Although Westbrook implies that the "transparency" theory was abandoned in the 1970s, in fact it
continued to operate in some ways. Westbrook acknowledges this in noting that "[tihe latest grand effort to
achieve transparency is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed in 2002 in response to Enron and other accounting
scandals." Id. at 46.
187. WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 49. Because of its reliance on portfolio diversification, the "risk
management" approach is also referred to, Westbrook explains, as the "portfolio management" approach. Id. at
36 (noting that "portfolio theory and risk management are one and the same - one term is used in banking
regulation, and when things go badly, and the other is used in the academy").
188. Id. at 49.
189. Id.
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emphasis on diversified portfolios provide any protection against a tsunami-like
panic in which all assets are suddenly regarded as unreliable or overvalued or
both. To use Westbrook's metaphor again, putting eggs in different baskets to
divide our risks of disaster'" also will not work in a system that is thoroughly
integrated. In short, both theories, "transparency" and "risk management," belong
in our column of "failures" as we survey the lessons of the GFC 08/09.
Worrisomely, this now places us in a position of deep uncertainty and
danger. Ironically, as the world emerges from the GFC 08/09, the danger is all
the greater since some people might be led to believe that the system is not
broken. Westbrook summarizes the danger this way:
In early 2009, as a few institutions started to recover and things stopped
declining quite so badly, some financial elites had the temerity to suggest
that [Americans] should not be too upset by the financial crisis.
[According to these elites, the] industrial revolution hurt people. So the
financial revolution may be expected to hurt people, too. All we need
[according to this argument] is to try, try again, and the ingenuity of Wall
Street would bring more prosperity, and more safety, than the debacle
might suggest.
[However, the] argument that the present crisis is merely a detour in the
triumph of modern finance, the equivalent of a truly horrible nineteenth-
century industrial accident, fails to understand the nature of the crisis,
and specifically, the reasons why the best information and modeling
systems in the world, functioning under the best conditions the world has
ever seen, failed so miserably.'
In reviewing the nature of the GFC 08/09, and particularly the role that
information, rationality, and markets play in it, we should guard against over-
reaction based on an exaggerated assumption of the efficiency of markets and
rationality of players in it. Cornell University's Professor Robert Hockett, whose
writings on international financial law have generated great interest, recently
offered this explanation:
[T]he questions that have emerged in the current discussion are not only
about what went wrong, but also more fundamental in character. They
implicate not only regulatory policy, but also financial theory, monetary
theory, macro theory more generally, and micro theory as well. "Maybe
markets are not efficient after all," we hear some now saying. "Maybe
market actors are not rational either," some also say. "Maybe it's all just
psychology," or "irrational exuberance," . . . we hear more and more
190. Id.
191. Id. at 52.
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often these days. Well, maybe indeed. But I've come to think that at least
some of the discussion we're hearing these days rests on a misconception
or two, and that it would be helpful to highlight them, even for those who
are skeptical of market efficiency or trader rationality. Doing so should
enable us better to recognize which proposed improvements to our
financial system are apt to be most effective, and which of them less so.
So what are the misconceptions I think I detect? These: My impression is
that there is a tendency among some participants in the current
discussion-as well as among some policy-makers over the past decade
or so-to equivocate, first, between two senses of "efficiency," and
second, between two senses of "rationality." I suspect, moreover, that
these equivocations might well be partly responsible for the pass in
which we now find ourselves. Here's what I mean.
First, on "efficiency," the so-called "efficient capital markets hypothesis"
(also "ECMH," sometimes "EMH") familiar to finance is a pretty well
corroborated conjecture concerning the speed with which the capital
markets aggregate "information." But the information in question, it
bears emphasizing, is not restricted to facts actually bearing upon firms'
"fundamentals" or future prospects. (If it were, then informational
efficiency would conduce straightaway to allocative efficiency, more on
which presently.) No, the "information" in question also can include
misinformation, disinformation, incomplete information apt to be revised
or more fully filled in later, and so forth. The idea animating the EMH, in
other words, is simply that trading has become sufficiently rapid and
easy, and the financial markets so liquid, that securities prices very
quickly impound and reflect the beliefs of all market participants-even
beliefs that in the end prove ill-founded, incorrect, only partly correct, or
what have you.
Moreover, and possibly more crucially, the EMH has nothing whatever
to say about facts bearing upon firms' future prospects of which no trader
as yet has any knowledge or inkling at all-facts that would fall under
the Keynesian (and Knightian) headings of "uncertainty" as
distinguished from "risk." Where we not only don't know which face of
the die will land up, but also don't know what values are etched on the
faces of the die to begin with, we cannot speak of probability
distributions at all, hence cannot compute even "expected" values, let
alone actual ones. Hence we speak less of "risk" than "uncertainty" in
these settings. . ..
Now the equivocation on "efficiency" to which I alluded above is just
this: There seems to be a tendency for some participants in the current
discussion to conflate informational efficiency (on the EMH's permissive
understanding of "information" just elaborated) either with allocative
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efficiency, whereby capital flows toward its most valued uses; or just
plain "efficiency," understood as a rough sort of synonym for "the state
of being really cool," or "as good as it gets." The unexamined thought
seems, in other words, to be that, because the capital markets quickly
take in and impound all value-pertinent information that there happens to
be, they also immediately and unambiguously direct capital toward
where it adds most value. But the moment one reminds oneself that
"information" is actually employed in a much looser sense than the
"fundamental-value-pertinent" sense for purposes of the EMH, one spots
a gap between informational efficiency and allocative efficiency.192
Taking these comments from Hockett together with the comments quoted
above from Westbrook, I draw these conclusions: (i) both the "transparency" and
the "risk-management" theories have failed to guard against systemic risk in
financial markets; and also (ii) when viewed accurately, the notion of
informational efficiency that has given many people confidence in financial
markets in the first place should not be expected to provide allocative efficiency,
which is much to expect.
4. Inadequacies of Multilateral Institutions and Networks
A fourth failure lies squarely at the international level: the multilateral
institutions and networks that are seemingly responsible for handling global
economic matters, and particularly for helping guard against global financial
crises, evidently fell short. I have gone to some lengths in subsection III(B) of
this article to describe the reforms the IMF has undertaken in the dozen years
since the Asian financial crisis erupted; yet that set of reforms did not prevent the
GFC 08/09. Nor were various international networks of regulatory entities and
non-government organizations able to avert the crisis through "soft law." Why
not?
In my view, two assessments are required to address this question. One
applies to the IMF. The other applies to the international "networks." I shall deal
briefly with the latter of these first.
Another of the participants in this symposium, Professor Douglas Amer of
the University of Hong Kong, has explained the role and operations of the
Financial Stability Forum ("FSF") since the time of its creation in the late
1990s.' Professor Arner points out that the FSF, together with such other entities
192. See Bob Hockett, What Maynard Keynes, James Dean, and Now Richard Posner All Have in
Common, DORF ON LAW, Sept. 28, 2009, http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2009/09/what-maynard-keynes-james-
dean-and-now.html.
193. See generally Douglas W. Arner & Michael W. Taylor, The Global Financial Crisis and the
Financial Stability Board: Hardening the Soft Law of International Financial Regulation? (Asian Inst. of Int'l
Fin. L., Working Paper No. 6, 2009), available at http://law.hku.hk/aiifl/research/documents/AIIFLWorking
Paper6June2009.pdf. Amer also explains the background and operations of the FSF in his earlier book. See
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as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision ("BCBS"), the International
Organization of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO"), the International
Accounting Standards Board ("IASB"), and the International Association of
Insurance Supervisors ("IAIS"), can be seen as the principal form of
"cooperation and coordination that nationally-based regulatory agencies have
used to adapt to the realities of the global financial system in the past thirty years,
with international standard-setting bodies being at the core of [the] response."'
Unfortunately, as Professor Amer makes clear, this policy network system, even
following its enhancement after the Asian financial crisis into "a hardened soft
law approach of coordinated networks," proved to be "insufficient to address
either prevention or resolution of a truly global financial crisis."'95
As I understand Professor Amer's views, the reason for this failure is that
despite the increasing globalization of private-sector financial institutions and
operations, the public-sector (official government) regulation of those institutions
and operations remains predominantly at the national level, reflecting a decision
at the time of the Bretton Woods discussions that "finance would be domestic
and subject therefore only to domestic regulation." In my view, this approach
must be reversed in today's integrated international financial markets. I shall
return to this issue below in subsection B(l). First, however, let us see why the
IMF did not prevent the GFC 08/09, despite the reforms discussed above.
Although we might adduce several reasons-relating, for example, to the
declining influence (and falling lending activity'97 ) of the IMF at the very time
those reforms were being made, or to some substantive errors in the IMF's
judgment and prescriptions'"-I believe the largest reason for the failure of the
IMF to prevent the GFC 08/09 lies with the handful of countries controlling the
IMF. This leads me to identify a fifth and a sixth specific failure, relating
respectively to legitimacy and "cultural intelligence," described below. In other
words, although I see a failure in the fact that the IMF did not avert the crisis, I
believe the responsibility for that failure lies not so much with the institution
ARNER, supra note 121, at 74-79.
194. Amer & Taylor, supra note 193, at 2.
195. Id.at 28. Professor Westbrook underscores how one element in this "soft law" network - the so-
called "Basle II" regime, which purported to fine-tune capital adequacy guidelines - proved especially
inadequate: "Basel II provides an object lesson in irresponsibility. It is one thing for regulators to admit that
they do not know how much capital to require banks to hold in reserve. Indeed, it s not clear that we can ever
know precisely what capital requirements are adequate to confront an uncertain future. It is quite another thing
to defer the decision to big banks, as does Basel II. ... [This] was quite literally irresponsible . . .
WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 61.
196. Amer & Taylor, supra note 193, at 26.
197. See supra text accompanying note 72.
198. As in other aspects of IMF operations, I would point out that just because the GFC 08/09 occurred
does not necessarily mean that the IMF activities in the years leading up to the GFC 08/09 were wrong-headed
or negligent, since we can never know whether the crisis would have been even worse in the absence of those
IMF activities. I have emphasized this point-the fact that there is no "counter-factual" reality with which to
make a comparison-in discounting the criticism that IMF-prescribed economic and financial policies have
caused countries to suffer economic distress. See, e.g., HEAD-2008, supra note 46, at 178-79.
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itself as it does with the United States and a few other states whose governments
largely control the institution.
5. Failure of IMF Institutional Legitimacy
A failure of legitimacy-the fifth specific failure in my list-relates directly
to the "democracy deficit" described above in subsection III(B). As explained
there, a handful of countries control the IMF through a combination of
mechanisms. These include the weighted voting system (under which practically
all voting power reflects proportional relative quota allocations), the claim of
right by the European powers to select the Managing Director, the lack of
external accountability through an effective system of judicial review, and more.
I believe the IMF has been severely restricted in its influence because of the
failure to replace or at least significantly reduce these mechanisms with a system
of governance that is broadly accepted as legitimate. Without these severe
restrictions in its influence, it seems altogether possible that the IMF would, in
fact, have been a natural repository for regulatory authority and coordination of a
sort that could have avoided the GFC 08/09 or substantially reduced the
devastation that the crisis caused so many people and countries.
6. Failure to Exercise Cultural Intelligence
The sixth failure on my list-also concentrated among those few countries
that control the IMF, especially the United States and European states-is a lack
of "cultural intelligence." By this I mean a lack of understanding of (or interest
in) the capacities and needs of most of the world, particularly national financial
systems. This lack of understanding has led, I believe, to an assumption among
private-sector financiers and public-sector regulators that sophistication in
financial operations and institutions that they are able to create and permit,
respectively, is appropriate for use by persons outside the narrow community of
financial whiz-kids.
I expect this to be a complicated and controversial point, so I shall try to
"unpack" these assertions. I believe certain financial products, such as CLOs and
CDOs and DCSs'9-found attractive in the last few years because of the liquidity
they provide through securitization-are too sophisticated. Too sophisticated for
whom? Too sophisticated for (i) most investors world-wide, including those
inside highly-developed financial systems such as that of the United States, and
(ii) most regulators in countries that do not have highly-developed financial
systems. These new and highly sophisticated financial products constitute a form
of "attractive nuisance"-something that is harmless if left alone by unknowing
199. These instruments - collateralized loan obligations, collateralized debt obligations, and credit
default swaps, respectively - were identified in Westbrook's description of increasingly sophisticated financial
products. See supra text accompanying note 182.
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passers-by (for example, young children) but which is extremely dangerous if not
left alone. For better or for worse, many investors, including seemingly astute
institutional investors, were attracted to the sophisticated financial products
emerging from the imagination of their creators. These sophisticated financial
products contributed, in my view, to what the IMF's chief economist has called
an "economic environment [that] is so complex as to appear nearly
incomprehensible." 2 00
Indeed, the complexity of some financial instruments and operations can be
so great as to flummox even those persons who invented them. Gillian Tett, an
award-winning assistant editor at the Financial Times, gives this account of how
a group of former JPMorgan officials who played a central role in developing
and marketing the so-called "super senior" aspect of CDOs-that is, the part of a
CDO that was supposed to be immune to any default-reacted when that
assumption proved to be false:
[Bill] Demchak didn't know whether to laugh, cry or just shake his head
in wonder.. .. In fact, he was horrified: the way [officials of Citigroup]
told the story, super-senior had turned into a scourge that had created
most of its unexpected losses.
"How could this happen?" Demchak wondered.". . .
To most Citi executives, the bottom-line hit was as stunning as if the
ground had opened up under the bank. On the day of the announcement,
Jamie Dimon, chief executive of JP Morgan, bumped into a former
senior colleague at Citi. "What happened?" Dimon asked. "We are not
entirely sure ourselves," the man replied. Dimon had no reason to doubt
him. By 2007, Citi operated as a vast empire so fragmented-and
feuding-that the many businesses within it rarely interacted. As a result,
few of the bankers outside the CDOs team knew how the operation
worked. "Perhaps there were a dozen people in the bank who really
understood all this before-I doubt it was more," one senior Citi
manager recalled bitterly.
As the losses mounted, the former members of the JP Morgan team that
had originated the idea of building collateralized debt obligations out of
credit derivatives reeled in shock....
200. Olivier Blanchard, (Nearly) Nothing to Fear But Fear itself, EcONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2009, available
at http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story-id=13021961. For a similar view, see IMF, IMF
Survey Magazine: IMF Research, IMF: Prevent Institutions Becoming Too Connected to Fail (Apr. 21, 2009),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2009/RES042109B.htm (explaining that an April
2009 IMF report asserts that "the growing complexity and globalization of financial services can ... lead to
situations where an institution's miscalculations of its risks could lead to its demise, spawning a large number of
failures of financial institutions, liquidity squeezes, and even severe capital losses in the financial system" and
that "the ongoing crisis has shown how financial innovations have enabled risk transfers that were not fully
recognized by financial regulators or by institutions themselves").
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[B]y late 2007, the e-mails bouncing between their BlackBerries were
expressions of disbelief. "What kind of monster has been created here"
one of the former JP Morgan group wrote in a heartfelt e-mail. Another
observed: "It's like you've known a cute kid who then grew up and
committed a horrible crime."20'
Given how unsuspecting those inventors of CDOs were of the havoc their
complicated invention could (and would) cause, it should come as no surprise
that investors were likewise unsuspecting. By way of illustration, one of the
participants in our symposium explained how German state-owned banks
invested heavily in such sophisticated financial products and suffered huge losses
from doing So.202
Naturally, a judgment as to whether a product of any sort, whether a CDO or
a chainsaw, should be prohibited from use or sale would need to be based on a
weighing of the danger it poses versus the benefit it promises. Given the danger
that creative and complicated new securitization products have now (via the GFC
08/09) been proven to pose, my own assessment is that this danger outweighs the
purported benefit that such securitization offers. Let me use an analogy that I find
apt: just as the "precautionary principle" has been generally accepted in
international environmental law,203 it should also apply to the introduction of
complex new financial products. In my view, such products should be
prohibited-or at least designated as "off limits" to any investor not satisfying
strict "suitability" standards 20-unless, and until, the potential benefit of those
201. Gillian Ten, How Greed Turned to Panic, FIN. TIMES, May 8, 2009, at 17.
202. See Harald Hau & Marcel Thum, Subprime Crisis and Board (In-)Competence: Private vs. Public
Banks in Germany (CESifo, Working Paper No. 2640, 2009), available at http://www.ifo.de/pls/guestcil
download/CESifo%20Working%2OPapers%202009/CESifo%2OWorking%2OPapers%2OMay%202009/cesifol
-wp2640.pdf (quoting Wolfgang Minchau, Another Landesbank bites the dust, Eurointelligence, Aug. 8, 2007,
http://www.eurointelligence.com/Article3.1018+M50fcec22186.0.html, bemoaning the fact that the supervisory
board members of state-owned banks in Germany "do not fully understand the ins and out [sic] of investments
in new financial instruments, such as CDOs or DCS").
203. See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14,
1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (August 12,
1992) (stating that "[iln order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by
States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation"). See also PHILLIPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
210 (1995).
204. Such "suitability" standards - also referred to as "sophisticated investor" standards - are found, for
example, in Section 4(2) of the US Securities Act of 1933 (as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)), which permits
private placements (that is, sales) of securities without the filing of an extensive registration statement, if certain
procedures are strictly followed. Among these is the requirement that all of the purchasers in that private
placement "must be sophisticated - that is, they must have sufficient knowledge and experience in financial and
business matters to be capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment". See Legal &
Compliance, LLC, Private Placement Offerings, http://www.legalandcompliance.com/Private-Placement-
Offerings.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2010). See also MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW
94 (3d ed. 2001) (offering a similar definition of the level of sophistication a person must have in order to be a
suitable purchaser in a private placement for purposes of Secton 4(2)).
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products is definitively proven to outweigh the danger they have already been
shown to pose to the international financial system.
It is worth noting that the danger such financial investments pose has been
especially intense in less economically developed countries. Regulators in those
less sophisticated economies generally did not, in the run-up to the GFC 08/09,
impose restrictions prohibiting financial institutions under their supervision from
dealing with such products. And how could they? In a global and essentially
borderless system of finance, it would be almost impossible to impose and police
such restrictions. To apply my metaphor, no fence could adequately keep
passers-by away from the attractive nuisance.
A similar point applies to the danger posed by certain types of financial
institutions. That is, in looking beyond financial instruments to financial
institutions, we see that a wide range of so-called "shadow banks"-including
not only hedge funds but also other forms of structured investment vehicles-
have emerged in recent years and have largely avoided the disciplining scrutiny
of regulation.205 In my view, such institutions should be prohibited or strictly
regulated. A country that fails to do so exposes itself to systemic risk that is
difficult to assess and difficult to guard against effectively.
I am not alone in my criticism of sophisticated financial instruments and
operations. For example, the chief economist at the World Bank recently
emphasized that "[t]he size and sophistication of financial institutions and
markets in the developed world are not appropriate in low-income markets."20
Even more broadly, the prominent economist Paul Krugman has offered this
broadside attack on "shadow banks" and the failure to regulate them properly:
As the shadow banking system expanded to rival or even surpass
conventional banking in importance, politicians and government officials
should have realized that they were re-creating the kind of financial
vulnerability that made the Great Depression possible-and they should
have responded by extending regulations and the financial safety net to
cover these new institutions. Influential figures should have proclaimed a
simple rule: anything that does what a bank does, anything that has to be
rescued in crises the way banks are, should be regulated like a bank.2 0
205. For an explanation of "shadow banking" and the risks it poses, see Mike Konczal, Shadow
Banking: What It Is, How It Broke, and How To Fix It, ATLANTIC ONLINE, July 13, 2009, http://business.the
atlantic.com/2009/07/exclusiveinterviewwhatisshadowbanking.andhowdiditjfail.php. See also Hugh
Dixon & Richard Beals, Europeans Favor Regulating 'Shadow Banks,' N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/business/24views.html (noting perceived dangers of unregulated hedge
funds and other "shadow banks").
206. Justin Lin, Walk, Don't Run, ECONOMIST, July 11, 2009, at 76.
207. PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008 163 (2009).
Krugman also asserts that the lack of regulatory control of the shadow banking system amounted to "malign
neglect." Id.
103
2010 / The Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009
Two other extremely high-profile economists have called for even more
radical regulatory change: a re-imposition of the operational separation between
commercial banking and investment banking-in short, a return to the days of
the Glass-Steagall Act.203 According to both Paul Volker (former chairman of the
U.S. Federal Reserve Board) and Joseph Stiglitz (Nobel prize-winner and former
economic advisor at the World Bank), the repeal of that legislation in 1999
helped cause the GFC 08/09 and should therefore be reversed. 209 My own view is
that this legislative change, radical though it would be, is indeed worth careful
consideration. The Glass-Steagall repeal both permitted and invited bankers to
downplay the significance of risks they were exposing themselves to, at the
ultimate expense of their depositors, their shareholders, their institutions, and the
financial system more generally.
B. "Fixes"
I have identified above six specific failures that help account, in my view, for
the GFC 08/09. To summarize, they are:
* A failure of national regulatory authorities and processes to protect
against systemic risk;
* A failure (also at the national level) of "self-regulation" as a means
of guarding against crisis;
* A failure (still at the national level) of both key theories that have
characterized the thinking about how to avoid financial disaster-
that is, both the theory of "transparency" and the theory of "risk
management";
* A failure of international institutions, both the IMF and the "policy
networks" applying "soft law", to prevent global financial crisis;
* A failure of the handful of countries controlling the IMF, particularly
the United States, to accept (at least until very recently) the need to
give that institution adequate legitimacy; and
* A failure of the same handful of countries (again, particularly the
United States) to act with "cultural intelligence" regarding extremely
sophisticated financial instruments and operations.
208. For discussions of the Glass-Steagall Act and its pertinence to the GFC 08/09, see Anand
Chokkavelu, The Biggest Cause of the Financial Crisis, MOTLEY FOOL, Apr. 13, 2009, http://www.fool.com/
investing/general/2009/04/13/the-biggest-cause-of-the-financial-crisis.aspx; William Kaufman, Shattering the
Glass-Steagall Act, COUNTERPUNCH, Sept. 19, 2008, http://www.counterpunch.org/kaufmanO9192008.html.
209. See Louis Uchitelle, Volcker Fails to Sell a Bank Strategy, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 20, 2009, available at
httpJ/www.nytimes.comt2009/10/21/business/21volcker.htmldbk (reporting Volker's proposal for reintroducing the
Glass-Steagall restrictions, and Stiglitz's endorsement of that view).
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What "fixes," if any, might counteract these failures? I place the word
"fixes" in quotation marks to signify that it can carry two different shades of
meanings. On the one hand, a "fix" might be a genuine repair that would permit
whatever is broken to operate properly again, as if to begin life anew. On the
other hand, a "fix" might be a temporary injection of a drug that an addict seeks.
In the following paragraphs, I offer some observations about "fixes" of both
sorts.
1. Strengthening Financial Regulation
For one thing, I believe there should be, and there almost surely will be, a
burst of enthusiasm for additional regulation at the national level. Many entities
within national systems will pay close attention to the specific nature and
emphasis of such regulation. 210 Supplementing these national-level initiatives will
be advice coming from the multilateral level. The IMF, for its part, has already
identified a first round of "lessons learned" in terms of national financial
regulation. 21' As noted above, these include expanding the "perimeter" of
financial sector surveillance, strengthening capital adequacy standards,
improving the dissemination of information, and so forth.212 Andrew Crockett,
who has served as General Manager of the BIS, as a staff member and Alternate
Governor of the IMF, and as president of JPMorgan Chase International, has
summarized the categories of national financial regulatory reforms that are
needed by dividing them "into those that affect the institutional coverage of
regulation, those that change the substantive content of supervisory rules, and
those that modify the structure of regulatory oversight bodies."2 3
Reflecting the integration of the global economy, this new enthusiasm for
regulation also will extend beyond the borders of nation-states by prescribing
methods for international coordination among national regulators214 and
harmonization of the standards they apply to institutions operating within and
across their borders, what I referred to in subsection I(C) as "regulation of the
regulators." As expressed by the IMF, "[p]rogress is needed in tackling political
210. As Professor Hockett has noted, discussions and hearings were launched in September-October
2009 by the Angelides Commission and by US House and Senate committees, to consider possible
improvements to-and perhaps even a complete "overhaul" of-the US system of financial regulation. See
Hockett, supra note 192.
211. See generally IMF Regulation Lessons, supra note 18.
212. See supra text accompanying note 178.
213. Andrew Crockett, Rebuilding the Financial Architecture, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 2009, at 18.
214. Even before it was transformed into the Financial Stability Board, the Financial Stability Forum
was already, as of February 2009, coordinating efforts by the IMF, national authorities, and others to address
deficiencies in the system. See IMF Regulation Lessons, supra note 18, at 4. Professor Arner notes in this regard
that "[tihe FSF agreed upon twelve key standard areas, including a total of fifteen standards, as the basis of
internationally agreed minimum standards of financial regulation." Arner & Taylor, supra note 193, at 7, citing
the FSF website, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/keystandards.htm/. Various G-20 working groups
have also been set up to address some of these issues. See IMF Regulation Lessons, supra note 18, at 7.
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and legal impediments to the regulation and resolution of cross-border
institutions.""' Although I see some possibility that the enthusiasm for increasing
regulation will fade quickly with a recovery from the GFC 08/09, at least some
more and better regulations should be put in place to help guard against the
specific ills that contributed to, triggered, or exacerbated the crisis. These will
include, I hope, the prohibitions or restrictions I recommended above regarding
highly sophisticated liquidity-producing securitization investments, as well as a
wide array of standards and requirements that, as Professor Arner has reported,
the FSB has been instructed by the G-20 to put in place.
The new mandate of the FSB is important enough to warrant our closer
attention. Professor Amer offers this explanation:
The enhanced mandate awarded to the Financial Stability Forum (Board)
at the G20 London Summit reflected these demands for greater
international coordination. It reflects both the objective of improving the
on-going supervision of cross-border banking groups and the desire to
improve crisis management arrangements. Specifically, the FSB's new
mandate [involves the following]:21
(a) monitor and advise on market developments and their
implications for regulatory policy;
(b) advise on and monitor best practice in meeting regulatory
standards;
(c) undertake joint strategic reviews of the policy development work
of the international SSBs (Standards Setting Bodies) to ensure
their work is timely, coordinated, focused on priorities and
addressing gaps;
(d) set guidelines for and support the establishment of supervisory
colleges;
(e) manage contingency planning for cross-border crisis
management, particularly with respect to systemically important
firms; and
(f) collaborate with the IMF to conduct Early Warning Exercises.
[The FSB will assume these responsibilities in addition to those
originally assigned to the FSF, namely] to assess vulnerability affecting
the financial system, identify and oversee action needed to address them,
and promote coordination and information exchange among authorities
215. IMF Regulation Lessons, supra note 18, at 5. Special emphasis is placed on developing harmonized
insolvency regimes and on coordinating crisis responses across borders. Id.
216. See Arner & Taylor, supra note 193, at 11.
217. Id. at 11-12.
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responsible for financial stability.2 18 In support of its new objectives, the
FSB will establish a Standing Committee for [i] Vulnerabilities
Assessment; [ii] Supervisory and Regulatory Cooperation (including the
supervisory colleges and cross-border crisis management); and [iii]
Implementation of Standards [and Codes].
The intention underlying these reforms is clearly to enhance the existing
framework of soft law and to create something akin to an enforcement
mechanism beyond the current largely voluntary system.219 As [part of
their] obligations of membership, member countries and territories [of
the FSB will] commit to pursue the maintenance of financial stability,
maintain the openness and transparency of the financial sector,
implement international financial standards (including the twelve key
international standards and codes), and agree to undergo periodic peer
reviews, using among other evidence IMF/World Bank public Financial
Sector Assessment Programme reports.220 The latter represents a
departure from existing practice as participation in the IMF/World Bank
FSAP process has remained a purely voluntary exercise and the United
221States, for one, has not so far undergone such an assessment.
Another form of regulatory "fix" with both national and international
features would be the adoption of an insurance scheme, funded by financial
institutions themselves, to cover the risks that the financial sector creates. The
IMF's Managing Director referred to this in early October 2009:
Considering that the financial sector is creating a lot of systemic risk for
the global economy, and that it is just fair that such a sector would pay
some part of its resources to help mitigate the risks that they are creating
themselves, having some money coming from the financial sector to
create a kind of fund for insurance or funding for low-income countries
is something that we are going to consider.222
2. IMF Reform Toward Crisis Prevention
In addition to these FSB-based efforts to provide a "fix" in the area of
financial regulation, it also seems a sure thing that numerous IMF reforms of the
sort noted above in subsection HI(B)(2) will be implemented. These include
218. Press Release, Financial Stability Forum, Financial Stability Forum re-established as the Financial
Stability Board 2 (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_090402b.pdf
[hereinafter FSF Press Release].
219. Amer & Taylor, supra note 193, at 11.
220. FSF Press Release, supra note 218, at 1.
221. Arner & Taylor, supra note 195, at 12.
222. IMF, IMF Survey Magazine: In the News, IMF Chief Puts Focus on Building Stable Post-Crisis
World, (Oct. 2, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/survey/so/2009/NEW100209A.htm.
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modifications of quota allocations, revisions in the Managing Director selection
procedures, and a probable realignment of governing bodies' responsibilities.223
These reforms, all of which can be seen as responses to the "democracy deficit"
criticism, complement numerous other very recent IMF initiatives designed to
provide greater flexibility in providing financial assistance to its member
- * 224
countries in times of crisis.
In short, I have little doubt that we will see each type of "fix" identified
above-that is, (1) an increased enthusiasm and scope for financial regulation,
including enhanced efforts at multilateral coordination, and (2) the adoption of a
series of changes in the IMF and its operations, reflecting the G-20's call for
what I have referred to as the "reactivation" of that institution to respond to the
GFC 08/09. However, I see a significant risk that each "fix" will be only short-
term in nature, followed by backsliding. For example, I fear that the current
enthusiasm for strict, broad-based, internationally-coordinated financial
regulation will fade once the crisis seems to have receded.225
This would expose the deficiency that Professor Amer has identified in the
FSB-based system:
Although the FSB will play a role in facilitating discussion among its
members, what is lacking from the system is the ability to put its
members under binding obligations that will lead to a greater willingness
to burden-share the costs of cross border bank failures .. .. [Hence,]
without a more formal and binding arrangement for burden sharing and
dispute resolution arrangement, probably through a formal treaty and/or
international organisations, the problems raised by the failure of global
financial institutions will not be adequately addressed by the current
approach to international financial regulation.226
In my view, overcoming this deficiency in the FSB-based system is precisely
the sort of function that the IMF could serve, if the political will could be
mustered to give that organization the mandate and the legitimacy to do so.
However, I fear that the reforms made in the IMF's governance, significant
though they are, might end up being only a "flash in the pan," with the effective
control of that institution remaining in the hands of a small cluster of countries,
thus squandering the opportunity to increase the perceived legitimacy of the
223. See supra text accompanying notes IMF Quotas, supra note 70, Quota Recommendation, supra
note 84, IMF Consents to Agreement, supra note 87, IEO Governance Report, supra note 90, Experts
Governance Report, supra note 92, at 3-4.
224. See supra text accompanying note 77.
225. As one observer has expressed it, "[a] few months ago financial newspapers were debating the
future of capitalism. Now they are merely discussing the future of capital requirements. Shock has given way to
relief." Cox, supra note 2, at 4.
226. Amer &Taylor, supra note 193, at 30.
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227institution. Without such increased legitimacy, the IMF could not, and should
not, be granted enhanced authority over national and cross-border financial
regulation. I explore below in subsection C the reasons for my pessimism on
these two points-that is, my fear that we will not see enough of either (i)
enhanced networks for international coordination of financial regulation, or (ii)
enhanced IMF legitimacy and effectiveness in crisis prevention.
3. Renewed Ideological Commitment to Multilateralism
A third type of "fix" that I believe should be put place, but that I also fear
will ultimately fall short of what is needed, relates to international trade,
international investment, and multilateralism more generally. Although the G-20
communiqu6s from Washington, London, and Pittsburgh all urged further work
toward successful completion of the Doha Round of trade negotiations and urged
against protectionism tendencies generally,228 the temptations in the other
direction are strong, and some observers already warn of a resurgence of
protectionism.229 This would be a mistake. As I have urged elsewhere, trade
liberalization should be accompanied by effective safeguards against certain
distributional and social injustices that often accompany headlong rushes toward
such trade liberalization, 23 0 but the overall benefits that a liberal trade (and
investment) regime brings far outweigh the costs.
The same is true of multilateralism more generally. As I have also urged
elsewhere, I believe there is an urgent need now to restore confidence in a
multilateral regime dedicated to searching for global solutions to global
problems.231 I need not expand on that theme here, except to express the hope that
a new U.S. administration might provide the leadership needed to start such a
restoration of confidence as a broad-based populist ideology. However, I fear that
the same temptations that could draw states and their people toward
protectionism in their trade and investment policies might also undermine their
commitment to multilateralism more generally.
If they could be implemented, these three "fixes" might provide strong armor
against another global financial crisis falling close on the heels of the GFC 08/09.
227. On this point, I am influenced by the historical survey that James Boughton, the IMF Historian, has
offered on the numerous calls for a "new Bretton Woods". See James M. Boughton, A New Bretton Woods? ,
FiN. & DEv., Mar. 2009, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2009/03/boughton.htm (noting
that although efforts to create a "new Bretton Woods" have been made several times, "[m]any of those efforts
failed").
228. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
229. See, e.g., Karl P. Sauvant, FDI Protectionism Is on the Rise, 6-15 (World Bank Policy Research




230. HEAD-2008, supra note 46, at 173.
231. See, e.g., HEAD-2008, supra note 46, at 321-22.
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A more robust, more comprehensive, and more internationally coordinated
system of financial regulation might substantially reduce the risk of systemic
failures of the sort that precipitated the GFC 08/09. A reactivated and visibly
legitimized IMF might attract the support it would need to make it a listener, a
leader, and a lender-that is, a forum for a rich diversity of viewpoints to be
voiced and debated, a welcome source of substantive guidance, and a supplier of
short-term financial support on terms broadly regarded as reasonable. A deep
popular commitment to multilateralism, especially intent on expanding the
benefits of trade and investment liberalization with distributional and social
protections, could set the stage for a more cooperative international community.
C. Fundamentals
"When pigs fly," one might be tempted to say. That is, these three "fixes,"
and the benefits that could flow from them, might seem completely unrealistic
when viewed in the harsh light of reality, especially once the immediacy of the
GFC 08/09 fades.
I am undecided on this point: I am not confident enough to offer a firm
prediction of whether or not these three "fixes"-a much better system of financial
regulation, a legitimized IMF, and a victory of multilateralism over protectionism-
can in fact be implemented and sustained. However, as suggested above in
subsection B, there are strong reasons for doubting they will be. In the following
paragraphs, at the risk of uttering discouraging words despite the state song of
Kansas (Home on the Range), I shall summarize some reasons for pessimism on the
question of whether long-term effective changes will be made to guard against
another global financial crisis erupting relatively soon.
First, old ideologies die hard, especially if they are embraced by a class of people
long entrenched in power. As asserted by Simon Johnson, the former chief economist
of the IMF, the financial elites are quite firmly entrenched in power - so much so, he
says, that "[a] whole generation of policy makers has been mesmerized by Wall
Street," 2 and "the financial sector [has] a veto over public policy"233 I regard it as
highly unlikely that Johnson's call to "nationalize [the] troubled banks and break
them up as necessary" on grounds that "[a]nything that is too big to fail is too big
to exist"" will, in fact, be heeded. Further, I am not prepared to pass judgment on
whether the big banks should be broken up or not. However, I do believe that without
some drastic structural change putting financial institutions in new hands with new
mindsets, we are unlikely to see the first of the "fixes" mentioned above-the
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implementation of a significantly better system of financial regulation. The ideology
of deregulation236 is too strong for that to occur.
Second, the possibility of a new way of thinking about international economic
relations, including global financial regulation, exists best-perhaps only-in a time
of crisis. While some observers have emphasized just how severe a crisis the GFC
08/09 has been by asserting that there will now be a "new normal,"237 I question
whether even this crisis has been severe enough to prompt profound changes. The
GFC 08/09 has not been as severe (so far, at least) as the Great Depression.
Moreover, our circumstances today are unlike the circumstances in 1944, when the
specter of yet another world war prompted leaders of those countries who had just
emerged from the second one in roughly a quarter-century to design multilateral
regimes to address global economic problems.
Third, we have very little evidence that humans learn large-scale economic
lessons from large-scale economic mistakes. In Part IV above, I summarized several
twentieth-century episodes in which economic mistakes brought devastating distress
over and over and over again. Even the passage of a mere dozen years-from the
Asian financial crisis to the GFC 08/09-seems more than enough to erase
memories, so that the pattern of enthusiasm, greed, deregulation, boom, and bust gets
replayed again.
Fourth, as long as U.S. influence continues to dominate international economic
relations, the culturally ingrained disdain in this country for government-curiously,
even self-government-will augur against multilateralism by which global problems
are attacked with global solutions organized and implemented by governments. Paul
Krugman traces the apparent intransigence of the U.S. anti-government attitude to
the 1980s, when U.S. President Ronald Reagan was able to instill in millions of
Americans "an ideology that says government intervention is always bad, and
leaving the private sector to its own devices is always good." 238 Krugman faults U.S.
236. Johnson lists these elements of "a river of deregulatory policies" that has flowed into the US
financial system in recent years:
- insistence on free movement of capital across borders;
- the repeal of Depression-era regulations separating commercial and investment banking;
- a congressional ban on the regulation of credit-default swaps;
- major increases in the amount of leverage allowed to investment banks;
- a light hand at the SEC in its regulatory enforcement;
- an international agreement [Basel] to allow banks to measure their own riskiness;
an intentional failure to update regulations so as to keep pace with financial innovation.
Id. at 5.
237. See Cox, supra note 2, at 5 (claiming that "a 'new normal' for the world economic is in sight, [and]
it will be different from the old normal in a number of ways." including sluggish demand, the necessity to
maintain government stimulus plans for a long time, a rise in public debt, continued high unemployment, and
suppression of innovation). See also Westbrook, supra note 10, at 55 (asserting that "this is a new day" in
finance).
238. Paul Krugman, All the President's Zombies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2009, at A17. The famous line
encapsulating this ideology, appearing in Reagan's first inaugural address, asserts that "[i]n this present crisis,
government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem." See Ronald Reagan, U.S.
President,Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid
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President Obama for not using "the bully pulpit to confront government-is-bad
fundamentalism.""' He also offers this perspective on the GFC 08/09:
There's a lot to be said about the financial disaster of the last two years,
but the short version is simple: politicians in the thrall of Reaganite
ideology [of "government-is-bad" fundamentalism] dismantled the New
Deal regulations that had prevented banking crises for half a century,
believing that financial markets could take care of themselves. The effect
was to make the financial system vulnerable to a 1930s-style crisis-and
e ci 240the crisis came.
=43130. According to a February 2009 Rasmussen telephone survey, a very large majority of Americans
endorse that view. See 59% Still Believe Government Is the Problem, RASMUSSEN REPS., Feb. 26, 2009,
available at http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public-content/politics/general-politics/february_2009/59_still
believe_govemmentisjthe-problem.
239. Krugman, supra note 238, at Al7.
240. Id.
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